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The Board of Editors is pleased to announce the election of the following
Associates as officers for volume fifty-seven: Editor-in-Chief, John L. Zenor;
Managing Editors, Karl J. Ege and Derek W. Hunt; Article Editors, Terry
Calvani and Ellen S. George; Research Editor, Richard B. Sullivan; Note
and Comment Editors, Robert N. Cowen and Stephen M. Snyder; as Mem-
bers of the Board of Editors: George W. Brandt, James A. DeMent, Jr.,
John J. Gallagher, Anthony 0. Garvin, Arthur D. Goldberg, Robert A.
Hillman, Paul G. Hughes, Dominick A. Mazzagetti, Robert L. Osar, Douglas
K. Smith, Christopher C. Wheeler (Program Director), and Thomas E.
Willett (Business Manager).
The following students have been elected to membership in the Cornell
Chapter of the Order of the Coif: David L. Boehnen, Andrew J. Howat,
Thomas 0. Kellogg, Kenneth J. Kelly, Charles Matays, Joan I. Oppen-
heimer, Barry M. Portnoy, Charles F. Rechlin, Richard L. Smith, Daniel
V. Sollecito, Peter J. Spinelli, Steven K. Weinberg, and Stewart M. Weiner.
COMMENT
TRANSSEXUALISM, SEX REASSIGNMENT SURGERY,
AND THE LAW
Transsexualism,' hermaphroditism,2 and transvestism have oc-
I A transsexual is an individual anatomically of one sex who firmly believes he belongs
to the other sex. This belief is so strong that the transsexual is obsessed with the desire
to have his body, appearance, and social status altered to conform to that of his "rightful"
gender. TRASsExuAusm AND SEx REASSIGNMENT 487 (R. Green & J. Money eds. 1969) (Glos-
sary) [hereinafter cited as GREEN & MONEY]; Bowman & Engle, Sex Offenses: The Medical
and Legal Implications of Sex Variations, 25 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 292, 306-07 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as Bowman & Engle].
Preference for the social role of the biologically opposite sex begins early in life for
the transsexual. Two-thirds of a group of transsexuals studied felt as though they belonged
to the other sex by the age of five. This was confirmed by independent interviews with
their parents. Pauly, The Current Status of the Change of Sex Operation, 147 J. NERVous
& MENTAL DISEASE 460, 463 (1968). The cross-gender identification strengthens with time,
and after puberty the members of this group unanimously believed that they belonged to
the other sex, wanted to be accepted by society as members of the other sex, and desper-
ately desired a sex change operation. Id. The strength of this desire was frequently mani-
fested by acts of genital self-mutilation.
Transsexuals are not homosexual. They consider themselves to be members of the
opposite sex cursed with the wrong sexual apparatus. They desire the removal of this
apparatus and further surgical assistance in order that they may enter into normal,
heterosexual relationships. On the contrary, a homosexual enjoys and uses his genitalia
with members of his own anatomical sex. Id. In addition, the transsexual syndrome begins
long before the individual is aware of what homosexuality or genital sexuality is. Id.
Medical science has not found any organic cause or cure (other than sex reassignment
surgery and hormone therapy) for transsexualism (id. at 462) nor has psychotherapy been
successful in altering the transsexual's identification with the other sex or his desire for
surgical change. "Numerous attempts at therapy, including intensive psychoanalysis, hyp-
nosis, aversion deconditioning, chemotherapy, and behavior therapy have been generally
unsuccessful-..." Id. at 465 (footnotes omitted). See Gelder & Marks, Aversion Treatment
in Transvestism and Transsexualism, in GREEN & MONEY 883, 383-413.
2 Hermaphroditism, sometimes called intersex, is "a congenital condition of ambiguity
of the reproductive structures so that the sex of the individual is not clearly defined as
exclusively male or exclusively female ... ." GREEN & MONEY 480 (Glossary). See Bowman
& Engle 294-95. There are other sexual anomalies that are also generally classified as cases
of intersex: pseudohermaphroditism (a condition in which the individual has the external
genitals and physical characteristics of one sex but the gonads of the other-termed testicu-
lar feminization when it occurs in a male); Klinefelter's syndrome (a sterile male having
47 rather than the usual 46 chromosomes-an XXY chromosome pattern instead of the
usual XY male pattern); Turner's syndrome (a sterile female lacking a chromosome-
exhibiting an XO pattern as opposed to the usual female XX chromosome pattern);
and the metafemale (a female having an extra X chromosome-an XXX pattern). GREEN &
MONEY 485 (Glossary); Bowman & Engle 295-99.
8 Transvestism is the act of dressing in the clothing of the opposite sex. It is usually
attributed to a psychological compulsion and is often practiced for the individual's general
sexual stimulation or to assist in the achievement of orgasm. GREEN & MONEY 487 (Glossary);
Bowman & Engie 305.
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curred in all societies since antiquity.4 Perhaps in response to these
infrequent aberrations,5 or possibly as an instinctive social ordering,
most cultures have regulated social conduct in such a way as to protect
the supposedly unique role of each of the "two" sexes. 6 Thus an early
Judaic code of sexual morality forbade the wearing of clothing of the
opposite sex.7 Joan of Arc was adjudged a heretic in part because her
transvestism was found to violate spiritual law.8
The cultural, religious, and moral assumption that man can be
classified into two clearly identifiable and distinct sexes quite nat-
urally became embedded in the law despite its inaccuracy.9 Recent
medical advances into the physiological and psychological nature of
Transsexuals dress in the clothing of the anatomically opposite sex and in this limited
sense are transvestites. However, cross-dressing is designed to put the transsexual at
ease, not for sexual arousal, and should not be classified as transvestism. Pauly, supra note
1, at 463. Many courts have used the two terms interchangeably, and the precise condition
under discussion appears only from an examination of the facts.
4 See E. DE SAvrrsCH, HoMosExuALrrY, TRANsvsnsar AND CHANGE OF SEX 17-27 (1958);
Green, Mythological, Historical, and Cross-Cultural Aspects of Transsexualism, in GRF-EN &
MONEY 13, 13-22.
5 Exact figures regarding the incidence of transsexualism are lacking. Dr. Harry
Benjamin, a noted authority in this field, estimates there may be as many as 10,000 trans.
sexuals in the United States. Benjamin, Introduction to GRE.N & MONEY 1, 9-10. Another
expert has estimated the incidence to be 1:100,000 for males, 1:400,000 for females. Pauly,
supra note 1, at 462. Dr. Jan Wilinder estimated the ratio in Sweden to be 1:37,000 for
males and 1:103,000 for females. Pauly, Adult Manifestations of Male Transsexualism, in
GREEN & MONEY 37, 57. Dr. Leo Wollman set the level at 100,000 cases of transsexualism
including the more common transvestism. Letter from Dr. Leo Wollman to the Cornell
Law Review, Jan. 26, 1971.
The authorities are in dispute as to the number of surgical reassignments that have
been performed. Compare Note, Sex-Change Operations and the Law, 87 S. AsR. L.J. 239,
241 (1970) (1,000 operations), with N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1966, at 32, col. 1 (2,000 opera-
tions). The Gender Identity Clinic of the Johns Hopkins University Hospital has received
over 2,000 requests for sex change surgery. Pauly, supra at 56.
6 Bowman & Engle, Medicolegal Aspects of Transvestism, 113 Am. J. PSYCHATRY 583,
584 (1957); see Edgerton, Pokot Intersexuality: An East African Example of the Resolution
of Sexual Incongruity, 66 Am. ANHROPOLocisr 1288 (1964). But cf. id. at 1290.
7 Bowman & Engle, supra note 6, at 584.
8 Id.
9 See note 4 supra.
The modem approach considers human sex to be a continuum ranging from the
nonexistent "pure" female to "pure" male. Bartholomew, "Hermaphrodites" and the Law,
2 MALAYA L. REv. 83, 89 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Bartholomew], citing K. MOORE,
EMBRYONIC SEX HORMONES AND SEXUAL DIFFERENTIATION 7 (1947). Hermaphrodites are
somewhere in the middle of this continuum. Transsexuals are biologically near one pole
but psychologically at the other. An analysis in terms of a sexual continuum is reasonable
in light of the many possible genetic variations. See note 2 supra. See generally Bartholo-
mew. See also Moore, Recent Developments Concerning the Criteria of Sex and Possible
Legal Implications, 31 MAN. B. NEWS 104 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Moore 1]: Moore, The
Sexual Identity of Athletes, 205 J.A.M.A. 787 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Moore M"].
[Vol. 56:963
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human sexuality,'0 however, challenge this legal assumption and raise
important questions in both civil and criminal arenas.
I
WHAT Is SEX?
It is probably impractical for the law to abandon the two-sex
assumption." The law must deal with social practicalities, not medical
niceties, and most people are clearly male or clearly female. In light
of present medical knowledge, however, it is improper for the law to
continue to rely on outward appearances for the determination of an
individual's sex, considering that determination's important legal
implications.' 2 A careful analysis must be made of the parameters of
human sexuality.'3 The object of such an analysis would be to arrive
at an administrable and equitable legal standard by which to test a
person's sex while preserving the traditional sexual dichotomy.
The medical profession' 4 considers the following factors relevant:
(1) sex chromosome constitution; (2) gonadal sex; (3) sex. hormone
pattern; (4) internal sex organs other than the gonads (e.g., a uterus or
sperm ducts); (5) genitalia; (6) secondary sex characteristics (e.g., facial
hair); (7) sex of rearing (usually the sex assigned at birth); and (8) as-
sumed sex role, or psychological sex.'5 Any or all of these criteria could
be used to test the sex of the average person. Naturally they would all
be in accord. A true transsexual, however, would register one sex on
10 Human sex is determined by a conglomerate of biological and psychological
factors. Bowman & Engle 301-02; Moore I, at 104-10; Moore U, at 787-88. An analysis of
these factors and their legal significance is presented in the text accompanying notes
14-49 infra.
11 Bartholomew 88.
12 A person's sex is often legally irrelevant. Such would be the case, for example, in
a trial for most criminal offenses. In laws dealing with subjects such as insurance rates
or wage-hour regulations sex may be peripherally involved: mortality is sex related,
and the state may have an interest in the protection of employed women different from
its interest in the protection of employed men. Sex is of crucial importance in domestic
relations law. Marriage, for example, has traditionally been permitted only between
individuals of opposite sexes. See Corbett v. Corbett (otherwise Ashley), [1970] 2 W.L.R.
1306, 1324, 2 All E.R. 33, 48 (P.D.A.). The Corbett case is discussed in the text accompany-
ing notes 271-87 infra.
Is Bartholomew 88.
14 Unanimity of medical opinion regarding the factors to be considered and their
relative importance is not to be found. Compare Bartholomew, with Moore I and Moore
I. The list presented in the text is generally accepted. Letter from Dr. Donald R. Laub,
Associate Professor of Surgery, Stanford University Medical Center, to the Cornell Law
Review, Jan. 18, 1971. See also note 35 infra.
15 Moore I, at 104-10.
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all scales but the psychological (and possibly the sex of rearing6). A
hermaphrodite would present an ambiguous pattern of sexual identity
under these factors.17
Which factor or combination of factors should be legally control-
ling? Clearly all cannot be required to coincide, as hermaphrodites
would necessarily remain unclassified. A simple majority of agreeing
factors is an inaccurate test since it incorrectly assumes each factor is of
equal significance.' 8 Unfortunately this is the law as applied to her-
maphrodites,' 9 although the rule has been subjected to severe criti-
cism. 20
Likewise, a chromosomal test would fail as applied to those af-
flicted, for example, with Klinefelter's syndrome.2' In addition,
[t]he "chromosomal sex" is merely of abstract, scientific and theore-
tical interest in the case of transsexuals. Nobody can see an XX or
XY constellation.
To insist that a person must live and be legally classified in ac-
cordance with his or her chromosomal sex violates common sense
as well as humanity. It reduces science to a mere technicality and
an absurd one at that.
With the same justification, one may insist that Rembrandt's
works are not paintings, but pieces of canvas covered with paint.
Accurate but asinine.22
16 It is not unknown for parents eagerly desiring a boy to raise a girl in the opposite
sex and vice versa. Such behavior could naturally lead to severe psychological dislocation
in the child's later life.
17 So too would pseudohermaphrodites and those suffering Klinefelter's, Turner's,
or the metafemale syndromes. See note 2 supra.
Dr. Moore has "plotted" some of these sexual abnormalities in a useful and con-
venient fashion. Moore I, at 111-13.
18 Stutte, Legal Problems Related to Chromosomes Abnormalities and Intersex, 33
AcrA PAEDOPSYCHIATRICA 241, 242-43 (1966).
19 The rule was formulated in a less sophisticated time and is attributed to Lord
Coke. 2 TAYLOR's PRINCIPLES AND PRACriCE OF MEDICAL JuIsPRuDENcE 273 (3d ed. T. Steven-
son 1883); Eberle, Rechtsfragen bei Transsexualismus, 91 DEUrScHE MEDimiscHE WocHEN-
scmu 1988 (1966); Stutte, supra note 18.
This issue has been litigated in modern times in an unreported case in Scotland.
Meyers, Problems of Sex Determination and Alteration, 36 MEICO-L EGAL J. 174, 177-78
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Meyers]. Medical evidence indicated the individual had the
female chromosome pattern (XX), both testicular and ovarian tissue, functional male
genitalia (although predominantly female in appearance), and generally a male psycho-
logical inclination. Id. at 177. The judge ruled that the male characteristics prevailed and
adjudged the individual a legal male. Id. at 178. The judge rejected the suggestion that
the hermaphrodite be allowed to choose the sex he preferred. Id. at 177.
20 Stutte, supra note 18. Even in 1883 it was recognized that "it must not be sup-
posed that the decision is so easy as Coke's doctrine would imply." TAYLOR's PRIN-
cmEs AND PRACTCE OF MEDICAL JuRPRUDEN E, supra note 19.
21 See note 2 supra.
22 Letter from Dr. Harry Benjamin to the Cornell Law Review, Jan. 6, 1971.
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A gonadal standard is inadequate because it leaves the true her-
maphrodite, who has the gonads of both sexes, unclassified. The same
would be true of the person who suffers gonadal agenesis, lacking the
gonads of either sex.23 Like the chromosomal standard, the character
of the gonads is largely irrelevant as a determinant of social behavior.24
Similar objections apply to the use of internal sex organs other than
the gonads as a single determinant.
Sexual hormone balance is not a reliable indicator of sex. It can
be varied by the administration of drugs and is drastically affected by
castration. Both procedures are inherent in the surgical sex reassign-
ment process. A change in hormonal levels also produces gradual
changes in secondary sex characteristics.
The perfunctory standard used for legal classification is the genital
sex of the individual. Doctors examine a newborn's external genitalia
and make the fateful determination that appears on official birth
records.25 Nevertheless a genital criterion is inadequate. Genital ab-
normalities are relatively frequent and occasionally no normal genitalia
are present.26
The sex of rearing, often but not always determined by the sex
declared at birth27 based on an examination of the genitalia,28 is a
more useful criterion. It conforms to social reality in that the individ-
ual has been trained in one sex and hopefully has adapted to that
sex role vis-h-vis society. Likewise, society has accepted the individual
in that sex role. The sex of rearing might be very relevant in the de-
23 Bartholomew 88.
24 Id.
25 Holloway, Transsexuals-Their Legal Sex, 40 U. COLO. L. R-v. 282, 286 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Holloway].
One case has arisen regarding the possible liability of a doctor or hospital for an
incorrect determination of sex at birth. Kaufnan v. Israel Zion Hosp., 183 Misc. 714, 51
N.Y.S.2d 412 (Sup. Ct. 1944). The physician in Kaufman incorrectly informed the parents
of a newborn infant that their child was a female. Several days later the parents were
informed of the error. The parents sued for the mental anguish they suffered due to this
misinformation and because they felt the child given to them was somehow not really
theirs. Justice Daly, following a traditional approach, ruled there was no cause of action
for negligently induced mental suffering in the absence of accompanying physical injury.
Id. at 715, 51 N.Y.S.2d at 413.
Although the rule stated in Kaufman is still the law, there is a trend toward allowing
recovery at least where there is clear and convincing proof of genuine mental suffering.
See W. PROSSER, HM BOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 55 (3d ed. 1964). Because of the damag-
ing psychological effect an incorrect diagnosis of sex could have on a child, assuming the
error remains undiscovered for a long period of time, the law may impose liability in
cases such as Kaufman.
26 Bartholomew 88.
27 See note 16 supra.
28 Holloway 286. .
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termination of the sex of a hermaphrodite, simply because his bio-
logical sex ambiguity could be resolved by his development and social
adjustment in one sex.29 But the sex of rearing fails completely in the
case of transsexuals, most of whom are reared in their anatomical sex.
A requirement that all the parameters of sex agree is unrealistic 0
and the "majority" rule is unsound in theory.31 Any single criterion
of sex fails either for incompleteness or because it does not provide a
socially useful standard-or both.3 2 There is an additional reason for
legal rejection of technical criteria.
The nature of a lawyer's training ... renders him one of the
least probable people to be of any assistance whatever in matters
which are properly the concern of specialist medical and scientific
study. This ... is the more so when they concern complex person-
ality and emotional problems, and perhaps physical disorders.
The lawyer is educated to a strictly deterministic concept of human
behaviour .... You will often see the spectacle of an uninformed
tribunal attempting to arbitrate on the accuracy of specialist
evidence. 33
Courts simply are not qualified to weigh complex, confusing, and pos-
sibly contradictory medical data. Furthermore a decision based on
technical information incorrectly assessed runs the risk of "wreck[ing]
everything that a doctor is trying to do for his patient."34
The remaining determinant of sex considered medically relevant
is the individual's assumed sex role or psychological sex.3 5 A court is
29 Eberle, supra note 19, at 1989.
30 See notes 15-17 and accompanying text supra.
31 See notes 18-20 and accompanying text supra.
32 See text accompanying notes 20-29 supra. See also Bartholomew.
A recent work purports to establish a system for the legal determination of sex. 1
TAYLOR'S PRINCIPLES AND PRACrICE OF MEDIcAL JURISPRUDENCE 119 (12th ed. K. Simpson
1965). Simpson categorizes the secondary sex characteristics as "presumptive" evidence of
sex. External sexual structures such as breasts and the genitalia are said to be "highly
probable evidence" of an individual's sex. Chromosomal sex and the internal sex organs
are considered "certain" determinants of sex. Such a system is probably adequate in the
average case or for the sexual identification of a corpse, for which it may have been
intended. But as applied to the transsexual or hermaphrodite, Simpson's system is clearly
inadequate. See notes 21-29 and accompanying text supra.
33 D. Green, Gender Identity, Some Legal Problems, July 27, 1969 (unpublished paper
presented at the First International Symposium on Gender Identity, London, on file at
the Cornell Law Review).
34 Id.
35 The significance to be given to psychological factors in determining sex is still
being debated in medical circles. However, it has long been considered to be a factor in the
sex determination process.
The existence of persons who have this distorted subjective perception of their
sexual identity [transsexuals] offers an opportunity to study the whole problem
of how human beings normally get their sense of being a male or a female.
[Vol. 56:963
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likely to shy away from such a standard because it is necessarily sub-
jective. Still, the psychological sex of an individual should be the single
most important standard used to judge his legal sex.36
The law is concerned with man's relations with other men and
with society as a whole. Because society considers them crucial, factors
other than a person's psychological sex cannot be ignored. In fact,
they must be held to be controlling if overwhelmingly contrary to the
assumed sex role. Thus, a preoperative transsexual would have to be
classified according to his anatomical sex. Society would consider a
fully anatomical male to be male regardless of a convincing feminine
appearance or the individual's inner beliefs. Society has a rightful,
dominant interest in seeing that the female impersonator is legally
considered just that-regardless of motive. The dangers inherent in
This sense of being either male or female is not a simple function of some
biological, endocrine, or other factor, but is, on the contrary, a complex psycho-
biological product.
Marsh & Worden, Psychological Factors in Men Seeking Sex Transformation, 157 J.A.M.A.
1292 (1955) (emphasis added). See also Bartholomew; Moore I; Moore IL. That it "is the
key to the transsexual theory ... is partly but not fully accepted by the medical profession
at the present time; it should be fully accepted within the next five years." Letter from
Dr. Donald Laub, supra note 14. "There seems to be a growing body of opinion that a
more important criterion is psychological orientation, especially where this is the domi-
nant factor." Strauss, Transsexualism and the Law, 3 Comp. & ILr'L L.J.S. AImcA 348, 857
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Strauss].
36 Bartholomew 97.
It has been assumed that the legal sexual dichotomy should be preserved. See text
accompanying note 11 supra. Implicit in this is the further assumption that once sex is
legally determined for one purpose, that determination is controlling for all purposes.
Respectable authority exists for a contrary, ad hoc, functional approach.
It is clear ... that sexual differentiation is a relative rather than an absolute
matter and as any classification of mankind, for legal purposes, into but two
sexual categories must, therefore, be a purely arbitrary classification it seems to
follow that any attempt to define sex for legal purposes must take into account
the specific purpose for which the classification is required, for it does not follow
that what is a suitable criterion for one purpose will necessarily be suitable
for another purpose.
Bartholomew 97.
Indeed we would go so far as to claim that there is no such thing as "legal sex;"
for legal purposes sex can only be defined in relation to each of the problems in
which sexual differentiation becomes relevant-it cannot be defined in vacuo.
Id. at 101-02. Accord, Corbett v. Corbett (otherwise Ashley), [19 70] 2 W.L.R. 1806, 1325, 2
All E.R. 38, 49 (P.D.A.); Edwards, Recent Developments Concerning the Criteria of Sex
and Possible Legal Implications, 81 MAN. B. NEws 104 (1959).
Such an ad hoc approach is untenable. First, it is illogical, although logic should be
the servant and not the master of the law. Of far greater importance is the detrimental
effect such schizophrenic legal treatment would have on the stability of already troubled
individuals such as transsexuals. How could any individual hope to find a meaningful,
well-adjusted existence if his sexual status were at the mercy of conflicting legal deter-
minations at every turn? Consistent legal recognition of sex is imperative in order to
facilitate medical treatment of transsexuals. See note 242 and accompanying text infra.
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having a procreatively functional male classified as a female are ap-
parent.
This is not the case after sex reassignment 7 surgery has been
performed. The individual s procreatively is no longer of his original
sex; he is sterile. Functionally he is a member of the "new" sex, capa-
ble of coition and often of achieving orgasm.3 9 Likewise, his secondary
sex characteristics are those of the "new" sex. His anatomy now con-
forms to his psychological self-image; only by medical examination or
chromosome tests may his "original" sex be determined.
The psychological test is appealing because it is at once practical,
realistic, and humane. In cases of doubtful biological sex identity such
as hermaphroditism, the test can be used to resolve the ambiguity. The
decision arrived at by the patient,40 his doctor, family, and friends as
to which sex the hermaphrodite is better suited should be accepted
and given legal effect by the courts. For transsexuals a psychological
test legally recognizes what the individual has thought himself to be all
along, a conception to which his anatomy now conforms. The require-
ment of completed reassignment surgery protects the public against pos-
37 The term "reassignment" is technically preferable to "conversion" or "change."
Psychologically, reassignment surgery does not alter a transsexual's sex. Biologically his
chromosomal sex cannot be changed. Some doctors, opting for a biological definition of
sex, insist that postoperative transsexuals "will remain castrated males [or females] and
they will not be made into [biological] women [or men]." J. Randell, Indications for Sex
Reassignment Surgery, July 26, 1969 (unpublished paper presented at the First Interna-
tional Symposium on Gender Identity, London, on file at the Cornell Law Review).
The surgical operation in the case of a male to female transsexual involves the
removal of the external male sexual organs and the construction of an artificial vagina by
plastic surgery. It is supplemented by hormone treatments that facilitate the change in
secondary sex characteristics. See generally Jones, Operative Treatment of the Male Trans-
sexual, in GREEN & MONEY 313, 313-22; Hoopes, Operative Treatment of the Female
Transsexual, in GEFrN & MONEY 335, 335-52. For a discussion of preoperative procedures,
see text accompanying notes 51-61 infra.
38 For convenience most of this discussion will deal with male to female surgery
because it is more frequently performed than the female to male reassignment. The
medical terminology favors calling a male to female patient a male transsexual because of
his origin, and a female to male patient a female transsexual.
39 W. MAsmms E & V. JOHNSON, HumAN SExuAL REFSPONSE 101-10 (1966). The artificial
penis created for a female transsexual is generally not sexually operative. See generally
Hoopes, supra note 37, at 341-42; Pauly, supra note 1, at 465.
40 This raises the interesting problem of the age at which a hermaphrodite should
be allowed to select his own sex. Stutte notes that German law allows a child whose,
parents belong to different religions to choose the faith he will follow at the age of 12.
Stutte, supra note 18, at 243. Since the condition of many hermaphrodites is discovered
at puberty, when as "females" they fail to menstruate or as "males" they commence the
female cycle, it is reasonable that the age of 12 or 13 could be determinative at least
where competent medical opinion concurs in the adolescent's choice. In such a case court
approval might be sought before sex clarification surgery is undertaken in order to protect
both the surgeon and the interests of the child.
[Vol. 56:963
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sible fraud4' and acknowledges that an irreversible medical decision
has been made affirming the patient's psychological sex choice.
[The medical profession] should be as conservative as possible in
consenting to an irrevocable "conversion operation," but after it
has been done and we are dealing with a fait accompli, it should be
made as easy as possible for the patient to succeed in his or her
new life. And the legal recognition of this new life is a very essen-
tial part indeed.& 2
Common sense dictates a recognition of a psycho-social criterion for
sex determination, at least after surgical intervention.
[T]he essential thing is going to be to show the courts photographs
of the individuals and say "if we are to say, for whatever reason,
that this individual has to be called a male, how do we explain
this?"
As judges pride themselves on common sense above all things,
I do not think that it is impossible that this situation could not be
provided for in terms of case law.... (I]f one says to the judges
"well, for medical reasons we've got to this point, now are we to in-
sist any longer that this individual should be registered as a male?"
I think the judges would exercise common sense and say "no,
there must clearly be a recorded change. . . ." [I]f the doctor
certifies that this change has taken place, it should be recognized
as a matter of law.43
The converted transsexual should not be denied the inner tranquility
and normality of existence to which all are entitled.
What does it comfort any of us to insist that an individual shall be
a man, when for all the purposes of ordinary life that individual
can only be, and be recognised, as a woman? What pride can
there be for a law which vetoes the attitudes dictated by ordinary
humanity?4"
As early as 1945 a Swiss court examined these issues and con-
cluded that psychological sex had to be accepted as the legal standard
when accompanied by surgical physical reassignment."
Now that the patient's psychic association with the female sex is
strongly supported by anatomical changes it appears to us impos-
sible to go back. It would therefore be advisable to recognize le-
41 Text accompanying notes 36-37 supra.
42 Letter from Dr. Harry Benjamin, supra note 22. See also notes 194-265 and accom-
panying text infra.
43 Green, supra note 33; accord, Holloway 294-95; Meyers 186.
44 Green, Transsexualism and Marriage, 120 NEw L.J. 210 (1970).
45 In re Leber (Neuchtel Cantonal Ct., July 2, 1945). The dedsion is reprinted in
full in E. n SAvrrscH, supra note 4, at 96-107.
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gaily a state which the law did not prevent from coming into
existence.4 6
The rationale of this decision is admirable considering that little was
known about transsexualism at the time.
This aversion [to male clothing, genitalia, etc.] may even lead to
self-muilation... or to castration .... It is cldear that it is not an
ordinary vice which can lead to such extremes and that the subject
must be driven to them by inner forces beyond his control.
This inclines us to attribute to the psychic element, in the de-
termination of sex, an importance at least equal to that of the physi-
cal element.... In granting him the civic status of a woman we are
satisfying the most profound desire of his being while consolidating
his psychic and moral equilibrium; at the same time we are facili-
tating his social adaptation by permitting him to lead a more
normal type of life than heretofore. The personal interest which
urges him to ask for a change of civic status is thus not opposed to
the interests of public order and morality-quite the contrary.4 7
Ultimately it is not for the law to decide the sex of an individual.4 8
The law must accept medical decisions in this area and give them the
legal effect that is in the best interests of the individual and society.49
What those best interests are is difficult to determine, especially since the
issues are clouded by conventional morality and religion. However, pro-
vided the psychological choice of the individual is medically sound, not
mere whim or caprice, and irreversible surgery has been performed,
society has no right to prevent the transsexual from achieving personal
happiness.
II
SEX REASSIGNMENT SURGERY-SHOULD IT BE LEGAL?
It would be incongruous for the law to accept the psychological
standard of sex determination yet hold reassignment surgery to be il-
46 E. DE SAVrrSCH, supra note 4, at 100, quoting Dr. Riggenbach, Medical Director of
the Hospital of Pr~fargier, Switzerland.
47 Id. at 104-05.
48 Strauss 856. See also note 49 and accompanying text infra.
49 Strauss 356.
Even the advocates of the functional, ad hoc, approach to the legal determination of
sex agree that primary responsibility rests with the medical profession.
The law must largely depend on and follow the lead and guidance of medicine,
but in the last resort the law has to be satisfied that the particular medical
classification is consonant with the legal principles applicable in each case for
the law cannot adopt definitions and classifications, however academically flawless,
if they are out of line with the practical relationships of everyday life.
Edwards, supra note 36, at 127. The "practical relationships of everyday life" require the
psychological element of sex to be given the utmost recognition. See text accompanying
notes 33-" supra.
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legal. For a transsexual, legal acceptance of such a standard is meaning-
less without corrective surgery. Assuming that the operation should be
legal, however, it is still necessary for the law carefully to regulate the
circumstances under which it may be permissibly performed. This is
so because the medical profession is not in complete agreement on the
wisdom of reassignment surgery50 and because such surgery has drastic
consequences on the patient's life and anatomy. The case for the opera-
tion's legality is strengthened if those performing the surgery exercise
cautious self-regulation.
There are presently twelve research and treatment teams aiding
the transsexual in the United States and Canada. 51 The procedures
that these medical facilities have designed for their own and their pa-
tients' protection may be relevant in the development of legal safe-
guards. 52 The process adopted at the Gender Identity Clinic of the
Johns Hopkins Hospital is typical.53 A potential patient is first ex-
tensively tested, interviewed, and evaluated by a team that includes
a psychiatrist, a psychologist, and a surgeon. Only when this evaluation
indicates that the individual is in all likelihood a true transsexual and
is physically and mentally suited to treatment does he proceed to the
second step. This involves even more extensive psychiatric testing. Hor-
monal therapy is undertaken to alter the secondary sex characteristics
and further tests of a physiological nature are conducted. If the Clinic
staff concludes that the patient is psychologically and physically ready,
the sex reassignment surgery is performed. Postoperative follow-up is
aimed at the total assimilation of the individual into society in the new
sex role; the patient is required to live near the hospital to facilitate
follow-up procedures.
At the University of Minnesota the transsexual is required to be
twenty-one years of age or older (for consent purposes) and unmarried.4
In addition, he is required to retain independent counsel to dis-
50 See text accompanying notes 62-67 infra.
51 Erickson Educational Foundation Newsletter, Fall 1970, at 2.
52 None of these institutions has undertaken surgery without extensive consultation
with counsel. Money & Schwartz, Public Opinion and Social Issues in Transsexualism: A
Case Study in Medical Sociology, in GREEN & MONEY 255, 254, 257; Letter from Dr. Donald
W. Hastings, University of Minnesota Medical School, to the Cornell Law Review, Jan. 12,
1971; Letter from Dr. Jon K. Meyer, Director, Gender Identity Clinic, Johns Hopkins
Hospital, to the Cornell Law Review, Dec. 18, 1970.
53 Johns Hopkins University, Statement on the Establishment of a Clinic for Trans.
sexuals at the Johns Hopkins Medical Institutions, Press Release, Nov. 21, 1966, in GREN
& MONEY 267.
For the procedure followed at the University of Minnesota, see Hastings, Inauguration
of a Research Project on Transsexualism in a University Medical Center, in GREEN &
MONEY 243, 248-51; text accompanying notes 54-56 infra.
54 Hastings, supra note 53, at 248-49.
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cuss the effect of the required consent papers and ensure that the
patient is adequately informed about the surgery.55 The attorney wit-
nesses the patient's signature to the consent form56 and stands ready
to assist in postoperative legal procedures to effect a change in civil
status. Johns Hopkins requires the patient to secure a consent to the
operation from the next of kin. This requirement ensures against the
giving of erroneous personal and social history by the prospective pa-
tient, safeguards against malpractice charges by the next of kin, and
guarantees at least minimal family acceptance of the procedure, fa-
cilitating postoperative rehabilitation. 57
A most important consideration is the length of time the patient is
observed prior to surgery. Dr. John Randell of the Charing Cross
Hospital in London requires his patients to live in the new sex role
for at least six and preferably twelve months prior to surgery.58 His rea-
son for this is simple: he does not consider the surgery justified unless
there is an "unequivocal demonstration that they are markedly better
adjusted in the role they desire than the role they have left."819 The
University of Minnesota likewise requires an adjustment period of at
least six months. 60
The procedures followed, only summarized here, are designed to
ensure (1) that the patient is a transsexual; (2) that recourse to surgery
is the only beneficial treatment available; (3) that the patient is com-
pletely aware of the possibilities and limitations inherent in the sur-
gery; (4) that he is capable of giving a valid and informed consent to
the surgery; and (5) that the surgery is almost certain to improve the
patient's physical and emotional condition. The entire approach is
summarized by Dr. Randell: "It's up to you to prove that you are a
suitable candidate for surgery." 61 Only after that has been demon-
strated, within the limits of medical certainty, is the operation per-
formed. Such procedures clearly warrant judicial approval.
Despite the rigor of the preoperative procedures the medical pro-
fession as a whole does not seem to condone such surgery. In discussing
the results of a study published in 1966,62 Dr. Ira Pauly stated that
55 Letter from Dr. Donald W. Hastings, supra note 52.
50 Id.
57 Money, Sex Reassignment, 9 INT'L J. PSYCEIATRY 249, 258 (1970).
58 J. Randell, supra note 37. See Hellier, The Sex Changes, San Francisco Chronicle,
Jan. 17, 1971, § 2F, at 8, cols. 3-5.
59 J. Randell, supra note 37.
60 Hastings, supra note 53, at 250.
61 J. Randell, supra note 37.
62 Pauly, supra note 1, at 466-67, citing Green, MacAndrew 9: Stoller, Attitudes Toward
Sex Transformation Procedures, 15 ARncrvis GzrmaAL PsycmATRY 178-82 (1966).
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neither a majority of the psychiatrists nor the general practitioners
surveyed would approve of the operation after being presented with a
case history of a transsexual. Noting that only one of every four of
these physicians was of the opinion that surgery would be detrimental to
the transsexual, Dr. Pauly speculated that other factors influenced the
decisions. "It appears that the primary deterrent is a practical, self-
protective one, wherein the physician is reluctant to jeopardize his
hard-earned reputation."' 6 3 He justified this conclusion on the basis of
the answers by these same doctors regarding a legal change of sex after
surgery had been performed: seventy-five percent recommended a "le-
gal change of sex"; eighty percent favored legal permission to be
identified and marry in the new sex role; and fifty percent would even
allow the converted transsexual to adopt a child. 4
Pauly administered an abbreviated edition of this same question-
naire two years later and found much more favorable attitudes.6 5 He
concluded that "it is ... possible that this represents a real trend in
the last few years toward more acceptance of the transsexual's problem,
related to the influence of the numerous publications and presenta-
tions . . . from the institutions [performing the surgery] . ... ,6" It
would seem reasonable that the thorough pre- and postoperative pro-
cedures followed, coupled with the legitimacy of the institutions in-
volved in sex reassignment surgery, will eventually lead to greater
acceptance on the part of the medical community.67
Surprisingly, clergymen have been more willing to condone sex
reassignment surgery than have men of medicine. A survey of thirteen
area clergymen conducted by the Baltimore Sun resulted in statements
approving the surgery by all but an official of the Catholic Church
who refused to comment.0 8 The Catholic Church, however, has given
its approval to at least one operation on the ground that "this opera-
63 Pauly, supra note 1, at 467.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 468. Sixty-five percent of those in Pauly's sample favored the operation under
the following circumstances: (1) the transsexual requested surgery; (2) a favorable case
history; (3) a psychiatrist's evaluation concluded that the transsexual was neither
psychotic nor severely mentally ill; (4) the patient still desired surgery after two years of
unsuccessful psychotherapy; and (5) a psychiatrist concurred that the operation was war-
ranted. Id. at 467.
66 Id. at 468.
67 Id.; Sherwin, Legal Aspects of Male Transsexualism, in GREEN & MONEY 417, 421.
It should be noted that part of the apprehension expressed by doctors may stem from the
unclear legal status of the operation. Green, Attitudes Toward Transsexualism and Sex-
Reassignment Procedures, in GREEN & MONEY 235, 239. See text accompanying notes 98-172
infra.
68 Green, supra note 67, at 240.
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tion is necessary for the mental and emotional health of a transsexual
and as such is required for him to live a normal life." 69 The Church
issued a new certificate of baptism in this case.70 In addition, a Presby-
terian minister has undergone the surgery and has been granted a new
birth certificate in Iowa. 71 Recently several Lutheran ministers in
Texas agreed that the transsexual's choice to undergo surgery is a
moral one.72 Although these examples indicate a favorable religious
attitude toward sex change surgery,73 religious opinion is not unan-
imous on the subject.7 4
The law cannot be guided solely by the presence or absence of
stringent medical testing and clinical procedures, or even by over-
whelming medical or religious approval. For example, it is extremely
doubtful that a doctor should be free from criminal or civil liability
for removing an individual's healthy arm, regardless of how badly the
individual wants it off or whether its removal is unobjectionable to
either doctors or men of the cloth. Its removal must be shown to be
of substantial therapeutic value before it should be legally allowed.7 5
Dr. Pauly has analyzed the postoperative results of surgery per-
formed on 121 male transsexuals discussed in the medical literature.
He concluded:
[I]t would appear that a satisfactory outcome to the sex reassign-
ment surgery, in terms of improved social and emotional adjust-
ment, is at least 10 times more likely than an unsatisfactory
outcome. There is no claim that the transsexual is free from
emotional conflict either before or after the procedure, but in the
majority of instances he is markedly improved.76
69 Confidential Correspondence from the Transsexual Involved to the Author, Dec. 28,
1970.
70 Id.
71 Toronto Daily Star, July 13, 1968, at 13, col. 1.
72 Letter from Dr. Deborah A. Majeau-Chargois, Director of Research, Erickson
Educational Foundation, Baton Rouge, La., to the Cornell Law Review, Dec. 29, 1970.
73 A further example is the sermon-dialogue between the Rev. William Glenesk and
Dr. Leo Wollman that took place during the regular worship services at the Spencer
Memorial Church (Presbyterian), Brooklyn Heights, N.Y., June 21, 1970. Discussing trans-
sexualism and reassignment surgery, Rev. Glenesk cited the Biblical reference: "Ye shall be
borne again." Erickson Educational Foundation Newsletter, supra note 51, at 1.
A study done for the 1970 General Convention of the Episcopal Church also favorably
discussed sex reassignment surgery. Id.
74 See Green, supra note 67, at 240-41.
75 In principle it would seem as though any drastic operation of a non-
therapeutic nature is unlawful, unless a legally justifiable purpose is sought to
be attained by it (e.g. a cosmetic improvement which will not substantially
endanger the life or health of the patient, or the removal of tissue or an organ
from a healthy person for the purpose of transplantation upon a diseased person).
Strauss 349.
76 Pauly, supra note 1, at 465.
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Dr. Randell made similar findings with his British patients.7t
[P]ostoperative results ... indicate that the majority of males and
females undergoing operation for sex reassignment are subjec-
tively and objectively improved both in their adjustment to their
environment and in their own feelings of well-being and satisfac-
tion in their gender role.78
Dr. John Money of the Gender Identity Clinic at Johns Hopkins
has studied twenty-four cases from his files in an effort to determine ob-
jectively the results of the operationin social terms.7 9 The criteria
used were the patient's expressed satisfaction with the surgery, em-
ployment results, police records, psychiatric records, and sexual rela-
tionships. He found that all of the male transsexuals (seventeen) were
"unequivocally sure they had done for themselves the right thing."80
Only one of the seven females was dissatisfied, 81 and part of her sur-
gery (phalloplasty 2) had failed. Occupational status improved in twelve
cases and remained the same in the others.83 Although six of the group
had been arrested prior to conversion surgery,84 only two were re-
arrested.85 Dr. Money found it significant that
[n]o patients acquired a police record for the first time following
reassignment. The majority ...melted into law-abiding obscu-
rity.... The cost to society for policing and jailing transsexuals
did not increase.... [I]t more likely decreased. 86
None of the twenty-four studied needed psychotherapeutic help for
the first time after surgery. Half of the patients had never needed or
received psychiatric treatment and ten of the remaining twelve were
able to discontinue therapy after the reassignment. 87 The results re-
77 Randell based his conclusions on 35 cases. Randell, Preoperative and Postoperative
Status of Male and Female Transsexuals, in GRu & MONEY 355, 379.
78 Id.
79 Money & Ehrhardt, Transsexuelle nach Geschlechtswechsel, in TENDENZEN DER
SEXUALFORSCHUNG 70 (G. Schmidt, E. Schorsch & V. Sigusch eds. 1970).
80 Id. at 84.
81 Id. at 85.
82 Phalloplasty is the surgical construction of an artificial penis.
83 Money & Ehrhardt, supra note 79, at 80-81.
84 Id. at 82. The arrests stemmed from charges of cross-dressing and impersonation,
soliciting, and in two cases, "robbing pickups of their wallets." Id. All those who had
been arrested were males. Id. at 83.
85 Id. at 82. The two who had been charged with robbery were rearrested for
soliciting. Id.
88 Id. The character of offenses for which a transsexual is likely to be arrested prior
to surgery, as suggested by the list in note 84 supra, indicates that arrests after surgery
should decrease because of the superior ability of the transsexual to remain undetected in
the new sex role. For a discussion of transsexualism and the criminal law, see text ac-
companying notes 173-93 infra.
87 Money & Ehrhardt, supra note 79, at 83-84.
1971]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
garding sexual liaisons indicated a tendency towards stability of sexual
partnerships.88
It would be hazardous for a layman to accept these studies as con-
clusively establishing the therapeutic value of the operation,89 but the
statements of these doctors, active and expert in this field, should at
least place a heavy burden of proof on one who argues that the surgery
is not therapeutic. Perhaps in the language of the law it could be said
that these reports create a strong but rebuttable presumption that the
operation is highly beneficial for the patient, and to some degree for
society.
Similarly, the observance of cautious preoperative procedures9"
creates a strong presumption that the operation was performed for a
therapeutic purpose. The results of reassignment surgery are too severe
and permanent to allow its unfettered use. If the surgery is legal,
however, only the doctor who cannot demonstrate that his preoperative
testing and evaluation measured up to the Johns Hopkins or Minnesota
standards91 should be answerable in either criminal or civil pro-
ceedings.
The preoperative selection and testing procedures certainly con-
form to the highest standards of medical professional responsibility.
A jurist should feel secure in the knowledge that such drastic surgery
is available only to those who have been cautiously adjudged to war-
rant it by competent specialists. Although approval of such surgery
by the medical community as a whole has not yet been firmly estab-
lished,92 the trend of opinion is in its favor.93 Likewise, any moral op-
position to such surgery, if such is the proper concern of the law,94 is
undercut by instances of acceptance of reassignment operations by
88 Id. at 84.
89 Cf. text accompanying note 3 supra.
90 See text accompanying notes 52-61 supra.
91 See text accompanying notes 52-61 supra.
92 See text accompanying notes 62-64 supra.
93 See text accompanying notes 65-67 supra.
94 Strong arguments can be made that the law should be amoral. Thus, the famous
Wolfenden Committee, commenting on the role of the law regarding homosexuality and
prostitution, formulated the following as its guide for legal involvement in sexual matters:
In this field, its function, as we see it, is to preserve public order and decency,
to protect the citizen from what is offensive or injurious, and to provide sufficient
safeguards against exploitation and corruption of others ....
... It is not, in our view, the function of the law to intervene in the private
lives of citizens, or to seek to enforce any particular pattern of behavior, further
than is necessary to carry out the purposes we have outlined.
COMMITrEE ON HoMosExuAL OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION, THnE WOLFENDEN REPORT 23-24
(authorized Am. ed. 1963). Sex reassignment surgery, performed by reputable physicians
under stringent self-adopted regulations, clearly does not impinge upon any of these
proper concerns of the law.
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organized religion as necessary for the health and happiness of the
transsexual. 95 There is every reason to believe the surgery is of sub-
stantial therapeutic value to the patient, and the elimination of his
suffering and deviant behavior benefits society as well.96 Such evidence
compels the conclusion that sex reassignment surgery should be legally
permissible.97
III
Is SEX REASSIGNMENT SURGERY LEGAL?
One impediment for a transsexual seeking surgery is the fear of
the medical community that the operation is of dubious legality.93
Although there is some conflict among jurisdictions, this fear is not
universally justified.
A. Argentina
This issue was presented in Argentina in the case of Ricardo
San Martin.9 9 The defendant was a surgeon who operated on one
Fibregas, removing his penis and testes, leaving a "pseudo-vulva." The
court found that the patient was a homosexual who did not have
feminine characteristics. His mental age was found to be that of a
twelve-year-old and on this basis his consent to the surgery was ne-
gated.100
95 See text accompanying notes 68-74 supra.
96 See text accompanying notes 76-89 supra. See also Green, Sex Reassignment-Critical
Evaluation: A Research Strategy, 9 INT'L J. PsYcHnATRY 269, 270 (1970) (emphasis in
original), where the author, the Director of the Gender Identity Research and Treatment
Clinic of the UCLA School of Medicine, states that "the critical question is no longer
whether sex reassignment for adults should be permitted, but rather for whom." See also
Hastings, Sex Reassignment-Critical Evaluation: The Surgical Route, 9 INT'L J.
PSYcHIATRY 273 (1970); Money, Sex Reassignment, 9 INT'L J. PSYCHIATRY 249 (1970);
Randell, Sex Reassignment-Critical Evaluation: An Emerging Entity?, 9 INT'L J. PsYCHI-
ATRY 275 (1970).
97 Meyers 176-77, 186; Strauss 351. But see text accompanying notes 98-105, 145-47 &
152-56 infra.
98 Doctors are equally afraid of possible civil liability for malpractice or battery. A
surgeon transforming a married individual runs the risk of a suit by the patient's spouse
for loss of consortium. Green, supra note 33.
99 123 La Ley 605 (C.N. Crim. y Correc., Argen. 1966). For discussions of this case in
English, see Meyers 183-84; Strauss 351-53; Note, The Sex Change Operation: Two Interest-
ing Decisions, 84 S. Ara LJ. 214, 217-18 (1967).
100 123 La Ley at 613. The court also negated the patient's consent because there
was evidence of wrongful intent on the part of the doctor. Although Dr. San Martin alleged
that he operated because of cancer of the patient's penis, it was found by the court that
FAbregas had not requested a chemical examination beforehand. The doctor had not
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The San Martin court adopted a chromosomal criterion for sex
determination: "He was a man and would continue to be so until the
day he dies. No female chromatin bodies were found in his cellular
nuclei."'' In addition, the court suggested that sex is determined by the
ability to procreate.
The action of the accused absolutely defies a truth of nature. He
knew he could not change a man into a woman. However, he at-
tempted to fool nature. However far medicine advances, it can
never violate the secrets of creation (procreation and death).10 2
Such a contention, if serious, would deny either masculinity or feminin-
ity to anyone who happens to be sterile.
This decision, as it relates to the consent of a mental incompetent,
is justifiable. However, the underlying moralism that pervades the
opinion casts some doubt on the validity of the factual findings. The
court found the doctor's actions morally repugnant.
The nature of the crime must also be considered because the
act per se constitutes a grievous assault on the man in his capacity
as a man, and in more general terms, an absolute disregard for the
social [natural] law-the one above all the norms of [positive]
law and morality-: the preservation of the species.
Mankind would subsist although every man in this world
were to have his arms cut off, were to lose his property, his honor
and his fatherland. However, if an act such as this were allowed
to go unpunished-if it were not severely punished-a gap would
be opened into which the whole human race could fall.103
Nevertheless the conviction was affirmed by the appellate court.104
This court also adopted a chromosomal test for sex, although it dis-
cussed the patient's psychological needs and found they did not justify
such surgery.
Ffbregas could not be somatically changed into a woman; the dif-
ference between the body and mind could not be remedied by
these means. Although it could be held that if it were psychologi-
cally possible to give relief to the anguish of Fbregas, such a
limited and incomplete solution could not justify the irremediable
corporal harm caused, apart from the moral and social implica-
tions.1 05
preserved the allegedly diseased penis nor had he prescribed postoperative treatment.
This, coupled with the plastic creation of a vagina, indicated the surgery had not been
performed because of cancer. Id. at 612.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 613.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.
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The high court seemed to rest its decision regarding consent on sexual
grounds rather than the low mental age of the patient.
[he consent was invalidated by the mental incompetence of the
victim whose sexual craving distorted the real scope and signifi-
cance of the operation, even supposing the best results.108
Three years later the case of Francisco Defazio07 came before the
Argentine court. Dr. Defazio had been charged with three counts of
aggravated assault stemming from sex change surgery. The first patient,
one M. Vega, was classified a pseudohermaphrodite10x One of his testes
was totally atrophied and the other partially. The forensic physicians
testified that this had resulted from deliberate chemical castration
brought on by the prolonged administration of female hormones.10 9
Chromosomally and genitally Vega was a male,110 but he had a female
psyche and a feminine hormonal balance.' The court, noting that
no useful organs were removed and that the operation was not injurious
to the patient, held that the surgery was legal since it was intended to
adapt the patient to his psychological sex.11 2
The second charge was based on surgery performed on L. Vega,
the first patient's brother. L. Vega was chromosomally male and had
normal external male genitalia, although there was some evidence of
deterioration." 3 Dr. Defazio contended that there was ovotestis"14 in
the patient and that he should be classed as a case of intersex.11 Since
L. Vega's behavior was that of a female, as were his secondary sex char-
acteristics, it was argued that the operation merely oriented him "bio-
psycho-sexo-socially.""6
P. Rojo, the third patient, had decidedly feminine secondary sex
characteristics and had shown signs of femininity since childhood." 7
106 Id. (emphasis added).
107 138 La Ley 592 (C.N. Crim. y Correc., Argen. 1969). For a discussion of this case
in English, see Strauss 354-56.
108 138 La Ley at 606. As is common in these cases this is probably a misnomer. The
reader should compare the definition of pseudohermaphrodite, supra note 2, with the
medical evidence presented regarding M. Vega's physique.
109 138 La Ley at 607. It was not shown that Dr. Defazio had been connected with
the administration of these hormones. Id.
110 Id. at 606.
ll Id. This could have been caused by the administration of female hormones.
112 Id. at 607.
113 Id. at 608. This could have been due to the administration of estrogen.
114 Ovotestis is an "abnormally developed sex gland of which the cell structure
partially resembles an ovary and partially a testis." GuEFN & MONEY 483 (Glossary).
115 See note 2 supra.
116 138 La Ley at 608.
117 Id. at 609.
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Hormone tests indicated elements of both sexes, but Rojo did have
external male genitalia, normal in appearance. 118 During surgery Dr.
Defazio's diagnosis of hermaphroditism was confirmed when he found
both a testicular formation and an ovary present.119
The appellate court reversed the convictions in both the Rojo and
L. Vega cases.120 There had been no proof of negligence (culpa) nor
any showing of an intention to cause bodily harm (dolus).121 Even if
it were assumed that the doctor's decision to operate was wrong, he
could not be held criminally liable for an error made after careful
study and diagnosis, provided he honestly felt the surgery was war-
ranted.122 The court was sensitive to the difficult medical considerations
involved in these cases and refused to convict where there was con-
flicting medical opinion.123 Judge Esteves, concurring, stated that a
court should consider recent medical developments regarding inter-
sexuals and noted that the influence of both sexes in every individual
is a biological fact.124
Of course Defazio does not overrule San Martin if that case is
considered to hold only that informed consent from a mentally com-
petent adult is a prerequisite to sex conversion surgery. San Martin,
however, seems to go far beyond such a narrow ruling.125 It is possible
that the courts of Argentina have adopted a distinction between sur-
gery upon hermaphrodites that "clarifies" their sex and reassignment
surgery for transsexuals that "contradicts" their anatomical sex.126
Some commentators suggest that a distinction should be drawn
between the hermaphrodite or intersex who is in need of anatom-
ical cure (a change to match genetic sex) and the transvestite and
other such sex deviates who presumably are anatomically normal,
but in need of psychological cure to bring their mental state into
harmony with their physique (a "cosmetic" change to satisfy
psyche). Under such a classification, the transsexual would be in
the latter class. The proponents of such a distinction suggest
surgery as proper in the first instance only to repair or change
118 Id. There was evidence of ovotestis as well.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 605.
121 Id. at 610.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 611-12.
125 See text accompanying notes 99-105 supra.
126 At least one member of the Argentinian court, Judge Esteves, apparently would
not make such a differentiation. He mentioned, with favor, the Belgian case of In re
Fardeau, which approved surgery upon a transsexual. 138 La Ley at 613. This case is
discussed in the text accompanying notes 131-36 infra.
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the individual's sex organs for his benefit and so as to achieve his
"rightful" sex.
The motivation for drawing such a distinction undoubtedly
stems from the belief that a person's anatomy may be altered
surgically, where it includes contradictory sexual elements, to
align it with "proper," genetic or chromosomal sex, but not where
the psychosexual orientation of the individual-not his anatomy
-is the only element inconsistent with genetic sex. The assump-
tion behind this distinction may be that all persons are immutably
either male or female (though in weaker or stronger degree) and
while this fact may be "clarified" by surgery (intersexualism), it
should not and cannot be "rebutted" by surgery (transsexu-
alism).127
The validity and usefulness of this distinction, however, are open
to question. Once again the issue is what determines a person's "right-
ful" sex. If physical incongruities such as those present in a hermaph-
rodite are sufficient to justify corrective surgery, so too should the
psychological incongruity of a transsexual, provided the doctor has
carefully determined in both cases that surgery is needed and likely
to benefit the patient. The presence of physical abnormalities does
offer the law an ascertainable guide for determining when the surgery
may be performed. But this does not preclude surgery based on psycho-
logical grounds; rather, it merely places a greater burden on the doctor
to show that the psychological evidence was decisive. 2 8 Even in the
case of a hermaphrodite, the surgery will not necessarily align the
patient's psyche with his chromosomal or genital sex. 129 The Argentin-
ian court approved the operations performed on the Vega brothers in
spite of their chromosomal maleness. Of course, the court noted that
no useful organs had been removed in these operations. But from a
pragmatic viewpoint, a transsexual's genitals are not useful because
they are not of the sex with which he identifies. He wishes to exchange
sexual apparatus useless to him for artificial genitalia that will be useful
in his new sex role. 3 0 A distinction between surgery justified by phys-
ical abnormality and surgery justified by psycho-sexual conflict should
not be drawn.
A conclusive statement of Argentinian law on this issue must await
further clarification. It is clear that the surgery is permissible if physi-
127 Meyers 184-85 (footnotes omitted). See also Bartholomew 111-12.
128 See generally text accompanying notes 35-44 & 51-61 supra.
129 In Germany, where surgery to reassign a transsexual is illegal, the operation is
permissible for hermaphrodites. The psychological criterion may control the outcome of
this surgery even if it conflicts with other sex factors. See Eberle, supra note 19, at 1989.
130 H. BENJ AmN, THE TRANsSEXUAL PHENOMENON 112 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
BENJAMIN].
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cal abnormalities are present. The Defazio decision does mark a trend
away from the harsh dicta of the San Martin case, indicating that the
courts of Argentina may approve reassignment surgery if performed
for valid reasons and with the patient's informed consent.
B. Belgium
In the 1969 case of In re Fardeau,'31 the defendant doctors were
charged following the death of a transsexual caused by blood clotting
after reassignment surgery. The patient had male genitals but the
secondary sex characteristics of a woman. His behavior was distinctively
feminine and he wore female clothing. The patient had contended he
was not homosexual but female, and sought surgery to bring his body
into line with his beliefs.' 32 Prior to surgery the transsexual hLd been
thoroughly examined by a panel of physicians. There was evidence of
smallness or malformation of the testes, and excessive female hormones
were present. 33
The prosecution alleged that there could not have been a valid
consent on the part of the patient and that the surgery had been per-
formed only to pacify the patient, not to cure him. The doctors con-
tended the surgery had been performed to restore the patient's psychic
balance and to facilitate his social adjustment. In a lengthy opinion,
the court accepted the doctors' positions. 34 Taking notice of the con-
flicting medical opinion regarding sex reassignment surgery, the court
concluded it should not decide which was the more proper view where
there was no question about the expertise and integrity of opinion on
both sides. The court noted that an exhaustive psychiatric examination
of a prospective patient would be desirable because "the highly excep-
tional and irreversible nature of the operation and its repercussions
upon the entire future of the patient render it imperative that recourse
should not be had to such an operation without as complete an exami-
nation as is possible."'' 35 Although the doctors had not performed such
a psychiatric evaluation in this case, the court said it undoubtedly
would not have led to a different diagnosis. The court also held that
since the patient was intelligent and well-balanced his consent could
not be negated solely because of his sexual abnormality.136
131 [1969] J. Trib. 635 (Cour Corr., 22e chambre, Bruxelles). For a discussion of this
case in English, see Strauss 353-54.
132 [1969] J. Trib. at 641.
133 Id. at 636.
134 Id. at 640.
135 Id. at 636.
186 Id. at 642.
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The Fardeau case is evidence of the legality of sex reassignment
surgery in Belgium when there has been an informed consent and
adequate preoperative medical evaluation.
C. Canada
Although there are no Canadian cases in point, it has been sug-
gested that reassignment surgery would be legal under section forty-
five of the Canadian Criminal Code,13 7 provided it could be shown
that the transsexual was in severe mental distress and would benefit
from the surgery.138
D. Denmark
Denmark has codified the requirements for castration surgery.13 9
Permission to perform a castration may be granted by the Danish
Ministry of Justice after the Medico-Legal Council of Denmark140 has
approved the request. The request will be granted if it appears that
the individual's sexual instincts make him liable to commit crime or,
relative to transsexualism, if his sexual inclinations cause him ap-
preciable mental anguish and injure his standing in society.' 41
The patient must be psychically normal, twenty-one years of age,
and request the surgery himself. A petition must be filed by the pa-
tient's doctor giving the reasons for the surgery and indicating that the
patient has been informed of the probable consequences. 42 Further
surgery, such as the creation of an artificial vagina, requires no per-
mission.
This was the procedure followed in the now famous case of
Christine (George) Jorgensen. 43 The surgery, however, will not now
be performed on a foreigner if he is not a domiciliary of Denmark. 44
137 Everyone is protected from criminal responsibility for performing a surgical
operation upon any person for the benefit of that person if
(a) the operation is performed with reasonable care and skill, and
(b) it is reasonable to perform the operation, having regard to the state of
health of the person at the time the operation is performed and to all the
circumstances of the case.
CAN. CaRM. CODE § 45 (Martin 1970).
138 Edwards, supra note 36, at 125-26; Meyers 181.
139 2 LOVSAMLING 1534, § 2 (7th ed. M. Karnov 1966) (Denmark); Stfirup, Legal Prob-
lems Related to Transsexualism and Sex Reassignment in Denmark, in GREEN & MONEY
453, 456.
140 For a description of the Medico-Legal Council, see Gormsen, Some Aspects of
Forensic Medicine in Scandanavia, 2 MEDICINE, SCIENCE & LAw 274, 280-81 (1961). Requests
for castration and sterilization constituted about 10% of the matters dealt with by the
Council in 1960. Id. at 281.
141 Stilrup, supra note 189.
142 Id.
148 Id. at 455 n.1.
144 Id. at 456.
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E. Germany
The first known sex conversion surgery was performed in Germany
in 1931.145 Nevertheless, it is considered to be illegal there,146 although
no cases directly in point have been found. The German courts have
refused to allow any postoperative changes in legal status. 147
F. Great Britain
No cases squarely resolving the issue of the legality of reassignment
surgery have arisen in Great Britain. Judge Ormrod of the Probate,
Divorce, and Admiralty Division, observed in dictum in Corbett v.
Corbett (otherwise Ashley): 148
There is obviously room for differences of opinion on the
ethical aspects of such operations but, if they are undertaken for
genuine therapeutic purposes, it is a matter for the decision of the
patient and the doctors concerned in his case. The passing of sec-
tion 1 of the Sexual Offences Act, 1967, seems to have removed any
legal objections which there might have been to such proce-
dures.149
An administrative decision favoring the legality of the surgery ap-
parently has been made, since the operation may now be paid for by
Britain's National Health Insurance plan.150 Opinion prior to these
rulings generally was that the legality of the surgery was questionable
at best.151
145 Pauly, supra note 1, at 460.
146 Eberle, supra note 19, at 1989, citing StGB § 226(a) (C.H. Beck 1965).
147 See text accompanying notes 203-08 infra.
148 [1970] 2 W.LR. 1306, 2 All E.R. 33 (P.D.A.). The Corbett case is discussed in
the text accompanying notes 271-87 inIra.
149 Id. at 1318, 2 All E.R. at 43 (dictum). Section one of the Sexual Offences Act pro-
vides:
Notwithstanding any statutory or common law provision ... a homosexual act in
private shall not be an offence provided that the parties consent thereto and have
attained the age of twenty-one years.
Sexual Offences Act 1967, c. 60, § 1(1).
It is not clear what relationship exists between the legalization of homosexual conduct
and reassignment surgery. In light of his conclusion that April Ashley was still biologically
a male, it can be assumed that Judge Ormrod would consider intercourse using the
artificial vagina to be "homosexual" conduct. Absent § 1 a judge might consider the
surgery illegal because it facilitates "homosexual" conduct. However transsexuals are not
homosexual (see note 1 supra) and vaginal intercourse hardly fits the usual description
of a homosexual act.
150 Hellier, supra note 58.
151 James, Legal Issues of Transsexualism in England, in GREEN & MONEY 441, 451
(only legal if full consent obtained and for proven therapeutic purpose); Lukianowicz,
Survey of Various Aspects of Transvestism in the Light of Our Present Knowledge, 128
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G. Holland
Sex reassignment surgery was the subject of an official Dutch com-
mission of inquiry in 1965.152 The commission concluded:
There are insufficient grounds for treating transsexualism surgi-
cally in the sense of sex transformation. Where this is nevertheless
undertaken, it must be realised that each operation is attended by
a great and uncertain risk, not only in the somatic sense but also,
and in particular, in the psychological sense, and there is no cer-
tainty whatsoever about its effect.153
Although the commission admitted there was a lack of empirical data
on the entire subject, it nevertheless concluded that the results of
plastic surgery were almost always disappointing and that, although the
patient's condition may improve in the short run, depression would
eventually reappear in many cases. 54 The commission noted that sur-
gery brought no satisfaction to several patients and questioned whether
sustained psychotherapy might not have brought an improvement,
avoiding permanent physical alteration. 55 The belief of a transsexual
that he is of the other sex was called a "delusion"; surgery could at
best only perpetuate the delusion.1 6
The conclusions reached in this study are six years old and of
doubtful validity today. 57 In the interim this report no doubt has had
a "chilling effect" on those who otherwise would have performed the
surgery. The surgery is legal in Holland, 8 regardless of the commis-
sion's findings, as Holland has a voluntary castration law similar to
Denmark's. 5 9
J. NERvous & MENTAL DISEASE 36, 57 (1959) (legitimate in exceptional cases). Cf. Williams,
Consent and Public Policy, 1962 CQrm. L. REv. (Eng.) 154, 159.
152 The report of this commission was unavailable. Reliance is placed on a summary
provided by Professor Strauss.
158 Strauss 850.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Id. Professor Strauss uses the word "cure" rather than "perpetuate." In the
context of his summary "perpetuation" of the delusion seems more appropriate. Cf.
note 241 infra.
157 The commission's report preceded most of the advances made in this field. For
example, the Gender Identity Clinic at Johns Hopkins was not formed until 1966. Johns
Hopkins University, supra note 53, at 267. Dr. Benjamin's landmark book The Transsexual
Phenomenon appeared at the same time. See generally text accompanying notes 51-97 supra.
It should also be noted that the commission relied extensively on the existing medical
literature and the testimony of two Dutch specialists, Dr. C.V. Emde Boas and Dr.
H. Musaph, both of Amsterdam. No transsexuals testified of their experiences after
surgical reassignment. Letter from SA. Strauss, Professor of Law, University of South
Africa at Pretoria, to the Cornell Law Review, Feb. 18, 1971.
158 Letter from Prof. S.A. Strauss, supra note 157.
159 Meyers 179; see text accompanying notes 139-42 supra.
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H. Switzerland
In the Swiss case of In re Leber,160 the court briefly mentioned
that the operation was legal if performed for a therapeutic purpose."' 1
I. United States
No reported cases have been found in the United States on this
question.162 In an unreported case, Judge James K. Cullen of Bald-
more issued a court order allowing the surgery to be performed on
a seventeen-year-old boy.163 This boy had first been referred to Johns
Hopkins for unusual sexual behavior in school. In 1961 he was arrested
for being drunk; at that time he was using lipstick. Later he was ap-
prehended for stealing women's clothing and a purse. In 1964, the boy
was again arrested, this time for stealing $800 worth of women's wigs.
He was diagnosed a transsexual and requested the surgery himself.
Judge Cullen issued his order at the urging of the boy's probation
officer.164
Louisiana and Illinois have provided for birth record changes for
those who have undergone sex reassignment surgery. 6 5 It is very un-
likely that these states' legislatures would enact such a provision if they
considered the surgery itself illegal.
Mayhem statutes166 are generally considered to present problems
for American surgeons wishing to perform sex reassignment surgery. 67
The original mayhem statutes enacted in England were designed to
prevent men from dismembering themselves or others so that they
would be unable to fight in the service of the Crown. 168 A specific
intent to maim or disfigure was required; 16 9 well-considered surgery
would lack such intent.170 Consent is not a defense to a charge of
160 Neuchfitel Cantonal Ct., July 2, 1945 reprinted in E. DE SAvrrscH, supra note 4,
at 96-107. See notes 45-47 and accompanying text supra.
161 E. DE SAVITSCH, supra note 4, at 103.
162 It has been reported, however, that several physicians have been threatened with
prosecution in connection with sex transformation surgery. Ficarra, Sex Problems in Law,
3 Lxx & SCIENTA 228, 229 (1966).
163 Money & Schwartz, supra note 52, at 254.
164 Id. at 254 n.1. The operation was never performed. Id.
165 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111.5, § 73-17 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1970); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:386 (Supp. 1971).
166 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 203 (West 1970).
167 Holloway 287; Money & Schwartz, supra note 52, at 257-58; Letter from Dr.
Donald W. Hastings, supra note 52; Letter from Dr. Jon K. Meyer, supra note 52.
168 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *205; Holloway 284 n.17.
169 See, e.g., People v. Bryan, 190 Cal. App. 2d 781, 787, 12 Cal. Rptr. 361, 364
(1961); Holloway 284 n.17.
170 Holloway 284 n.17.
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mayhem, since such acts are considered to be gross breaches of the
peace to which one cannot consent.'1 ' Proof of informed consent,
however, would negate an implication of malicious intent on the part
of the doctor.
Caution dictates that counsel be consulted before reassignment
surgery is performed. Mayhem statutes vary considerably from state
to state and often cover castration.1 7 2 The existence of a mayhem
statute should not be considered an absolute bar to the operation, but
it would be advisable to consult with the local district attorney or seek
an advisory opinion of the state attorney general before performing
sex reassignment surgery.
The cases do not establish any definite trend toward either legal
acceptance or rejection of sex reassignment operations. The humane
legislative position of the Scandanavian countries should receive recog-
nition in American courts, as should the well-considered and recent
decision in Belgium.
IV
TRANSSEXUALS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW
Even before the question of the legality of the surgery arises, the
individual transsexual must confront the criminal law. As with any
other group, most transsexuals do not run afoul of the law. Others,
encountering criminal problems unrelated to their condition, find such
problems compounded when their sexual status is learned.173 But in-
herent in the transsexual syndrome are behavior patterns 74 that are
likely to bring the individual into contact with the police.175.
171 State v. Bass, 255 N.C. 42, 120 S.E.2d 580 (1961); Rex v. Donovan, [19 34] 2 K.B.
498; 10 HALSBURY'S LAws OF ENGLAND 285 (3d ed. 1955).
172 See, e.g., Kitchens v. State, 80 Ga. 810, 7 S.E. 209 (1888).
173 See, e.g., Redmount, A Case of a Female Transvestite with Marital and Criminal
Complications, 14 J. CLiNicAL & EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 95 (1953).
174 Criminal problems arise from conduct such as wearing the clothing of the
"opposite" sex prior to surgery, having sexual relationships with members of the "same"
sex, and so forth.
Only one authority has suggested that transsexualism in any way causes the commission
of other criminal acts. Hoenig, Kenna & Youd, Social and Economic Aspects of Trans-
sexualism, 117 BRmsH J. PsYcHIATRY 163, 168 (1970). Forty-seven percent of the patients
studied had displayed antisocial behavior of some kind; 42% had actual criminal records.
Of these, 15% had been charged with sex related offenses, another 15% with sex offenses
as well as others, and 12% had been charged with non-sex related offenses only. Id. These
statistics led the authors to conclude "that transsexualists are very largely an 'out' group,
who feel inclined to act irresponsibly not only in the area where their psychosexual ab-
normalities could be seen as the prime motive but also in other respects." Id.
175 Mhe big trouble is, and this may perhaps be a slightly artificial distinction,
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The greatest single problem is that of cross-dressing. Laws in
at least eleven states could be used to prosecute transsexuals who cross-
dress prior to surgery. 7 6 One such law'7 was originally enacted over
100 years ago to deter farmers who had been attacking officers enforc-
ing unpopular rent laws. 1'7 8 The farmers dressed as Indians to disguise
themselves. The statute accordingly made it illegal to appear publicly
with the face painted or to be otherwise disguised in such a way as to
prevent identification. 1'7 9 Such a law is clearly subject to abuse by an
unsympathetic or uninformed policeman or tribunal. An even greater
problem arises from the multitude of local ordinances that regulate
public conduct. 80
Since these laws are not likely to be repealed or amended to suit
the few transsexuals they may affect, the emphasis must be on methods
to prevent contact with the law. Practical advice comes from Dr. Jon
Meyer of Johns Hopkins: "[T]he most obvious guideline is that if
you are going to cross-dress, don't be obvious about it."'8'1
Another preventive measure is the carrying of a card or letter
from the transsexual's doctor describing the individual's condition
and stating that the dress is required for proper treatment. Such a
permit has been issued to a preoperative patient by the Pennsylvania
Bureau of Special Health Services. 8 2 The Erickson Educational Foun-
he may have something to fear from the administrators of the law [if not the law
itself], and [he] must be aware that he is particularly susceptible to suspicion
from the police, and that actions which in a heterosexual may be utterly incon-
sequential may render a transsexual suspect.
Green, supra note 33 (emphasis added).
176 Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Nevada, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Texas, Utah, and Washington. Erickson Educational Foundation, Some Legal Aspects of
Transsexualism 2 (1970).
177 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35 (McKinney 1967), formerly N.Y. CODE CRaM. PROC. § 887(7)
(McKinney 1958).
178 Sherwin, supra note 67, at 418.
179 In New York a vagrant was formerly defined as "[a] person who, having his face
painted, discolored, covered or concealed, or being otherwise disguised, in a manner calcu-
lated to prevent his being identified, appears in a road or public highway, or in a field,
lot, wood or inclosure." N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 887(7) (McKinney 1958). N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 240.35(4) (McKinney 1967) holds a person guilty of loitering when he,
[b]eing masked or in any manner disguised by unusual or unnatural attire or facial
alteration, loiters, remains or congregates in a public place with persons so masked
or disguised, or knowingly permits or aids persons so masked or disguised to
congregate in a public place; except that such conduct is not unlawful when it
occurs in connection with a masquerade party or like entertainment ....
See also 21 SYRACUSE L. REV. 307 (1969).
180 Erickson Educational Foundation, supra note 176. Holloway notes that the City and
County of Denver, Colorado, for example, has an ordinance that deals with public dress.
Holloway 283 n.7.
181 Letter from Dr. Jon K. Meyer, supra note 52.
182 Erickson Educational Foundation Newsletter, supra note 51, at 1.
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dation, an organization concerned with transsexual research, also issues
such identification cards.8 3 Police in Hamburg, Germany, upon a doc-
tor's certification, issue special cards to transvestites. These cards do not
give permission to cross-dress but as a practical matter make the trans-
sexual relatively immune from arrest.18 4 A similar procedure is fol-
lowed in Denmark, where permits allow the transsexual to use toilets
of the sex in which he is dressed.18 s It is not known whether an iden-
tifying card or letter will successfully immunize a transsexual from
arrest in the United States, but it should at least rebut any presump-
tion that the cross-dressing was being done with an intent to defraud
or foment disorder. 8 6
The laws proscribing homosexual relations187 are another possible
source of arrest. Only a German case has been found in which
transsexualism was discussed in relation to homosexual conduct. 88 The
petitioner was a well-known male prostitute who wished to avoid
prosecution by being legally recognized as a female.8 9 Consistent with
other German cases regarding transsexualism, 190 his request was denied.
There is likely to be no postoperative difficulty. It is hard to
imagine an American court ruling that vaginal intercourse is a homo-
sexual act, even if the vagina has been constructed by plastic sur-
gery.191 Prior to surgery there is no such vaginal opening, and
183 Id. at 3.
184 BENJAmIN 140; Meyers 180.
185 Stiirup, supra note 139, at 457.
186 Erickson Educational Foundation, supra note 176.
187 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.38 (McKinney 1967) (encompassing buggery or
sodomy).
188 Meyers 180.
189 Id.
190 See text accompanying notes 203-08 infra.
191 Compare Corbett v. Corbett (otherwise Ashley), [1970] 2 W.L.R. 1306, 1326, 2 All
E.R. 33, 49 (P.D.A.), where Judge Ormrod states:
I would, if necessary, be prepared to hold that the respondent was physically
incapable of consummating a marriage because I do not think that sexual inter-
course, using the completely artificial cavity ... can possibly be described .. . as
"ordinary and complete intercourse" or as "vera copula-of the natural sort of
coitus." In my judgment it is the reverse of ordinary, and in no sense natural.
When such a cavity has been constructed in a male, the difference between sexual
intercourse using it and anal or intra-crural intercourse is, in my judgment to be
measured in centimetres.
This statement, Judge Ormrod admitted, was contrary to the dictum of the Court of Appeal
in the 1962 case of S. v. S., [1963] P. 162, [1962] 3 All E.R. 55 (C.A.). In that case the hus-
band sought an annulment on the ground that his wife had a malformed vagina that
prevented sexual intercouse. The husband alleged that even if a plastic operation enabled
consummation of the marriage true coitus would still not be achieved because the vagina
would be artificial. The Court of Appeal stated that an artificial vagina could not be re-
garded as essentially different from the enlargement of an incipient one. In both circum-
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intercourse must be conducted per anum or per os if at all. Although
in such a case there has been a technical violation of the sodomy
statute,192 proof of transsexualism should at least mitigate the punish-
ment given by the court. The act was objectively homosexual but
subjectively-in the transsexual's mind-it was heterosexual. 193
V
POSTOPERATIVE CHANGE OF CIVIL STATUS
Avoiding criminal prosecution and successfully completing surgical
reassignment mark the beginning, not the end, of the transsexual's en-
counters with the legal system. His name is inappropriate and must be
changed; his birth certificate states the wrong sex; his passport has the
wrong picture and name on it; his Social Security card must be
changed so that he may secure employment in the new sex. If formerly
a male, he has that ever-present reminder of his former sex, the Selec-
tive Service registration card. Whether the postoperative transsexual
can successfully alter his civil status, especially his birth records,
depends on which criterion of sex determination the law will follow.
A. Birth Records-Foreign Jurisdictions
The question of transsexual birth record changes does not ap-
pear to have been litigated in England.194 The 1948 edition of Taylor's
Principles and Practice of Medical Jurisprudence'19 5 stated that re-
registration of birth information may be made by a statutory declara-
tion. The procedure to be followed was outlined:
Application for the re-registration of the birth should be
made to the Registrar-General accompanied by the particulars
of the case by the medical practitioner who has examined the
child. If this is satisfactory the Registrar would be instructed to
re-register the birth on the information of one of the parents or
stances coitus would be vera copula. S. v. S. apparently disapproved an earlier decision in
B. v. B., [1955] P. 42, [1954] 2 All E.R. 598.
192 Such statutes are aimed at homosexuals, and transsexuals are not homosexual. See
note 1 supra.
193 A similar situation is present in cases of shoplifting where the transsexual may take
clothing (usually undergarments) of the other sex because it is embarrassing to purchase
them while dressed in the clothing of his anatomical sex. The law has been violated, but
a compassionate judge should not treat the transsexual as he would an ordinary thief who
acts for economic gain.
194 Green, supra note 83.
195 1 TAYLOR'S PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE (10th ed. W. Cook
& S. Smith 1948).
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other informant qualified under the Births and Deaths Registra-
tion Acts. Should there be no qualified informant available, then
the original entry would be corrected on the authority of a statu-
tory declaration, made by two persons cognisant of the facts, one
of whom would be the medical practitioner.196
There appears to be no authority for these assertions, 97 and they were
dropped in a later edition.198 Changes by marginal correction, however,
have been allowed in Britain,199 apparently at the request of a doctor
who declares there was a mistake in the initial registration. 20 Since a
genital examination at birth is the criterion used for sex registration,
such a declaration is probably incorrect in the case of a transsexual.
The "mistake" appears only later, when transsexualism becomes ap-
parent.
In a reported Scottish case, In re "X"'201 a request for a change of
birth certificate and name was denied. The sheriff adopted a chromo-
somal test of sex.
The doctors are careful to stress that this is not a case of her-
maphrodism [sic], but is a genuine case of the very rare condition
of trans-sexualism and that the changes which have taken place
are irreversible. For the present purpose I, of course, accept that
diagnosis. It is, however, stated that skin and blood tests still show
X's basic sex to be male and that the changes have not yet reached
the deepest level of sex determination. It seems to me accordingly
that while X could be described as an abnormal male, it would
not be possible to describe him as a female.202
In Germany sex is determined by the external genitalia. German
courts have held that the loss of the genitals, by surgery or by accident,
does not change a person's true sex.203 The change in secondary sex
characteristics brought on by hormone treatment is not considered to
indicate a change of sex because it is dependent upon the constant
administration of drugs. The surgically created and functional vagina
is classified as being feminine in appearance only. Sex reassignment
surgery itself is illegal in Germany.204 Because it does not recognize
sex change, German law of course does not permit birth certificate
changes.
196 Id. at 118.
197 Bartholomew 99.
198 See TAYLOR'S PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 32.
199 See Bartholomew 99.
200 Green, supra note 33.
201. 73 Sheriff Ct. Rep. 203, [1957] Scots L.T.R. 61 (Perthshire).
202 Id. at 205-06, [1957] Scots L.T.R. at 62.
203 See Eberle, suPra note 19.
204 See note 146 and accompanying text supra.
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This attitude has been reaffirmed in Germany as recently as
1969.205 The applicant was a boy who had undergone sex reassign-
ment surgery and wished his birth certificate changed accordingly. The
Oberlandesgericht of Frankfurt held it could not order the alteration
of a birth certificate that correctly stated the boy's sex at birth.20 6
Examining physicians from the Institute for Sexual Research at the
University of Hamburg termed the boy's condition transvestism, de-
fining transvestism as "an abnormal development of an individual's
personality which first manifests itself psychologically and later involves
a physical identification, either as a result of hormone treatments or
an operation. ' 20 7 The court, however, did not rule out the possibility
that such petitions might be granted in the future if medical advances
could show there had been more than a change in appearances.
Although ...there is the theoretical possibility that hormonal
and genetical factors may be involved in the causation of such a
situation, they are not yet identifiable according to scientific
knowledge presently available. . . .As long as medical science
does not provide a generally acceptable explanation of the origins
and the conditions of transvestism, such a person cannot be legally
classified as a member of the opposite sex after an operation has
changed his appearance. 20s
This court's willingness to reconsider its ruling is indicative of the
impact medical advances in this area are likely to have on the law.
Other countries have been more liberal in allowing a new birth
certificate to be issued. It has been allowed in South Africa,209 Switzer-
land,210 and in some cases, in Sweden.211 A recent Italian case held
that a transsexual's birth records should be changed to reflect his new
sex. The individual had at one time been a lieutenant in the Italian
army.21
2
B. Birth Records-The United States
Fifteen states have permitted a postoperative change of sex designa-
tion on birth records.213 Only two of these-Illinois and Louisiana
205 Judgment of Feb. 14, 1969, 22 NJW 1576 (OLG, Frankfurt). For an English discus-
sion of this case, see Note, supra note 5, at 239.
206 22 NJW at 1576.
207 Id. at 1577.
208 Id. at 1576.
209 Note, supra note 5, at 240.
210 E. DE SAvrrsCH, supra note 4, at 101-02; Meyers 180-81.
211 Wgflnder, Medicolegal Aspects of Transsexualism in Sweden, in GREEN & MONEY
461, 463-64.
212 Erickson Educational Foundation Newsletter, Spring 197l, at 2.
213 Alabama, California, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, New Jersey, North
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-have specifically provided by statute for a change following surgery,
however.214
Illinois requires simply "[a]n affidavit by a physician that he has
performed an operation on a person, and that by reason of the opera-
tion the sex designation on such person's birth record should be
changed. " 215 After the new certificate has been issued, the original is
sealed and available only upon court order.216 The Louisiana statute
is considerably more complex. It provides that:
Any person born in Louisiana who, after having been diagnosed
as a transsexual or as a pseudo hermaphrodite, has sustained sex
reassignment or corrective surgery which has changed the anatom-
ical structure of the sex of the individual to that of a sex other
than that which appears on the original birth certificate of the
individual, may petition a court of competent jurisdiction ... to
obtain a new certificate of birth.21 7
Since reassignment surgery alters only the genitalia, and the breasts
in case of a female transsexual, the "anatomical structures" referred
to in the act must be the genitalia, although such a term could also
encompass the secondary sex characteristics changed by hormone treat-
ment. The Louisiana legislature has also set a greater requirement
of proof than has Illinois.
The court shall require such proof as it deems necessary to be
convinced that the petitioner was properly diagnosed as a trans-
sexual or pseudo hermaphrodite, that sex reassignment or correc-
tive surgery has been properly performed upon the petitioner,
and that as a result of such surgery and subsequent medical treat-
ment the anatomical structure of the sex of the petitioner has been
changed to a sex other than that which is stated on the original
birth certificate of the petitioner. If the court shall find that the
evidence sustains the required proof, the court shall render a
judgment ordering the issuance of a new birth certificate .... 218
The original certificate is available only to the transsexual, and then
only by court order.2 19
Carolina, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Tennessee, Texas (Erickson Educational Foundation,
supra note 176, at 4), Iowa (Toronto Daily Star, July 13, 1968, at 13, col. 3), Colorado
(Letter from John Holloway, Resident Legal Counsel, University of Colorado, to the
Cornell Law Review, Dec. 21, 1970), and Minnesota (Letter from Dr. Donald W. Hastings,
supra note 52).
214 ImL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111.5 § 73-17 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1970); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:336 (Supp. 1971).
215 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111.5, § 71-17(l)(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1970).
216 Id. §§ 73-17(2)(a), (4).
217 LA. R y. STAT. ANN. § 40:336(A) (Supp. 1971).
218 Id. § 40:336(C).
219 Id. § 40:336(D).
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The Louisiana law has been applied in one unreported case, State
ex rel. A.D.M. tr. New Orleans.20 The city attorney of New Orleans
alleged
that it is not within the power of the City of New Orleans, or its
various departments to change the sex of a human being whether
in fact or by birth or other certificate . .. [and that] it is not
within the power of any Court nor any other human being to
change the sex of any other human being.22'
The legislature had ruled otherwise, however, and the court agreed.
The Louisiana statute is superior to that of Illinois. It dearly
prevents the possibility of fraud inherent in the simple requirement of
an affidavit. It ensures the validity of public records by requiring proof
of surgical change, and it reduces the likelihood of a later reversal
on the part of the transsexual by demanding proof of a correct diag-
nosis of his condition. Against these positive factors must be weighed
the cost of the litigation involved and the inevitable notice it will re-
ceive in the press. There can be little solace for the transsexual who
legally acquires a new sex only to confront unwanted publicity that
may drive him from the community in which he wishes to live. A wise
revision of the act might make the judicial proceedings private or pre-
vent the use of the petitioner's name, as is done in many states with
juvenile offenders and rape victims.
Statutes governing birth record changes in the remaining states
can be classified into three general categories: those that do not specifi-
cally allow or prohibit corrections, changes, alterations, or amendments
to birth certificates; those that permit only "corrections"; and those
that allow "alteration" or "amendment. '22 2 In the "correction" states
changes are allowed only where it is shown that there was an error in
the original registration. This usually precludes registration of a change
by surgery since the registration was technically "correct" at birth.223
In these states birth certificates supposedly attest only to the sex at
birth,224 although as a practical matter such an interpretation is grossly
unrealistic. The "alteration" or "amendment" statute seems to give
the agency charged with public record-keeping greater latitude in
allowing a change based on future events.2 25
220 No. 477-263 (Orleans Civ. Dist. Ct., Oct. 29, 1968). The author wishes to thank the
transsexual involved for furnishing copies of the documents relating to this case.
221 Answer to Petition for Writ of Mandamus, State ex rel. A.D.M. v. New Orleans,
No. 477-263 (Orleans Civ. Dist. Ct., filed May 3, 1968).
222 Holloway 288-89.
223 See text accompanying note 200 supra.
224 See Sherwin, supra note 67, at 423.
225 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-419 (1966).
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Regardless of the particular statutory provisions involved, an in-
formed and sympathetic administrative agency can be of great help
in securing a new certificate. Minnesota is a good example. Its statutes
provide that
[a] birth certificate of a person born in this state ... may be...
amended... upon submitting such proof as shall be required by
the [State Board of Health] ....
•.. Certificates ... which have been altered after being filed
with the state registrar shall contain... the date of the alteration
and be marked... "altered."
... All alterations made on birth ... records shall be in red
ink.
... A summary statement of the evidence submitted in sup-
port of the acceptance for ... alteration shall be endorsed on the
certificate.226
These provisions must be compared with the established practice of
the Board of Health in cases referred by the University of Minnesota
surgical team.
[S]ubsequent to legal change of name [by court order], the [trans-
sexual's] attorney petitions the State Board of Health for a
changed birth certificate. For patients born in Minnesota we have
an arrangement with the State Board of Health wherein a new
birth certificate is issued under the new name. It has upon it a
code number which indicates that a previous birth certificate
exists. The original birth certificate, however, is available only
upon court order.227
Such an "arrangement" is clearly not within the purview of the statute.
Not all administrative agencies have been so sympathetic. In 1965
a request for a new birth certificate was made by a postoperative trans-
sexual to the Director of the Bureau of Records and Statistics of the
Board of Health of the City of New York. The Board consulted the
New York Academy of Medicine, which in turn gathered a group of
gynecologists, endocrinologists, cytogeneticists, psychiatrists, and a
lawyer to study the problem.228 This committee concluded that
1. male-to-female transsexuals are still chromosomally males
while ostensibly females;
2. it is questionable whether laws and records such as the
birth certificate should be changed and thereby used as a means
to help psychologically ill persons in their social adaptation.
226 MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 144.171-.172(3) (1970).
227 Letter from Dr. Donald W. Hastings, supra note 52.
228 Anonymous v. Weiner, 50 Misc. 2d 380, 882, 270 N.Y.S.2d 319, 821 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
The agency had previously granted these requests. id. at 385, 270 N.YS.2d at 824.
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The Committee is therefore opposed to a change of sex on
birth certificates in transsexualism.
. . .The desire of concealment of a change of sex by the
transsexual is outweighed by the public interest for protection
against fraud.229
The agency, following the recommendation of the Academy's com-
mittee, denied the application. A suit was brought by the transsexual
for a court order requiring the agency to change her sex designa-
tion, name, and to issue a new certificate. Justice Sarafite, in Anony-
mous v. Weiner,23 0 denied the request. Viewing the problem as one of
administrative law, he found that the respondent agency had not
acted in an "arbitrary, capricious or otherwise illegal manner1231 in
denying the request.232 On the contrary, he believed the Board's actions
represented "adherence to the highest standards of the administrative
process." 233
The decision in Weiner is unimpeachable administrative law, but
the report of the New York Academy of Medicine, upon which the
Board's action was based, is not equally immune.234 Another New York
judge has already severely criticized the report in In re Anonymous. 23
Dealing first with the question of fraud, Judge Pecora made a realistic
appraisal of the transsexual's postoperative status.
A male transsexual who submits to a sex-reassignment is anatom-
ically and psychologically a female in fact. This individual dresses,
acts, and comports himself as a member of the opposite sex. The
applicant appeared before this court and, were it not for the fact
that petitioner's background was known to the court, the court
would have found it impossible to distinguish this person from
any other female. It would seem to this court that the probability
of so-called fraud, if any, exists to a much greater extent when the
birth certificate is permitted, without annotations of any type, to
229 Id. at 382-83, 270 N.YS.2d at 322.
230 50 Misc. 2d 380, 270 N.Y.S.2d 319 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
231 Id. at 384, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 323.
232 It should be noted that New York is a "correction of error" jurisdiction. See id.
at 383-84, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 822-23.
233 Id. at 382, 270 N.YS.2d at 321.
234 It would be improper for the Board to continue to rely on the Academy's report,
now six years old, in an area where medical opinion is rapidly changing. If such reliance
persists, another court might well find that a refusal to reconsider the questions involved
is itself arbitrary or capridous action.
The Weiner case has been discussed extensively in the literature with general dis-
approval. See Alexander, Family Law, 1966 Annual Survey of New York Law, 18 SYacusE
L. Rrv. 383, 394 (1966); Holloway 291-94; Meyers 183; Morse & Hall, Changing Sex on
Birth Certificates, 205 J.A.M.A., Aug. 5, 1968, at 289, 290; Note, supra note-99, at 216-17.
235 57 Misc. 2d 813, 293 N.Y.S.2d 834 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1968).
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classify this individual as a "male" when, in fact, as aforesaid, the
individual comports himself as a "female."2m6
At least one other New York judge has agreed with Judge Pecora that
fraud is unlikely to result in these cases.287 Judge Pecora also concluded
that the chromosomal test adopted by the Academy report was un-
realistic2 38 and inhumane.
[S]hould the question of a person's identity be limited by the re-
sults of mere histological section or biochemical analysis, with a
complete disregard for the human brain, the organ responsible for
most functions and reactions, many so exquisite in nature, in-
cluding sex orientation? I think not.2 9
Other criticisms of the Academy report remain. A chromosomal
standard leaves some people unclassifiable, and it ignores the other
determinants of sex.240 The Academy report also stated that the law
should not help psychologically "ill" persons adjust to society. The
medical evidence is that most transsexuals are not "ill" but are normal
in all respects other than their gender identity,241 and surgery renders
them normal in that area as well. Even assuming they are "ill," however,
the law should not decline to help them find a place in society. Medical
evidence strongly suggests that legal recognition of the sex change
greatly enhances the transsexual's adjustment.242 Before surgery the
transsexual's mind does not conform to his body's sex, and confusion
and depression result. If after the surgery-when his body and mind
agree-society refuses to recognize his status, there has been little im-
provement for him. 248
After an eloquent discussion of the problem, 244 Judge Pecora
236 Id. at 817, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 838.
237 See In re Anonymous, 64 Misc. 2d 309, 314 N.Y.S.2d 668 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1970).
238 See text accompanying notes 17-24 & 44 supra.
239 57 Misc. 2d at 817, 293 N.Y.S,2d at 838.
240 See text accompanying notes 17-24 supra.
241 The argument that sex-reassignment surgery is collaboration with psychosis
falters on two grounds. Currently available psychiatric interview and psychologic
test data indicate that the person requesting sex reassignment rarely is psychotic
by the standard diagnostic criteria. Furthermore, there is no body of evidence from
other psychiatric conditions, which demonstrates that fulfilling a patient's delusion
or ostensible delusion results in psychiatric improvement rather than an extension
of the delusional system and further decompensation. Postoperative data on
transsexuals indicate that such an adverse result is rare.
Green, Conclusion to GREEN & MONEY 467, 471,
242 Pauly, supra note 1, at 465; Letter from Dr. Harry Benjamin, supra note 22; Letter
from Dr. Donald R. Laub, supra note 14; Letter from Dr. Leo Wollman, supra note 5.
243 See generally text accompanying notes 14-97 supra.
244 57 Misc. 2d at 815, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 836-37.
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proposed a simple rule that clearly adopts the enlightened psycho-
logical test of legal sex. 245
Where there is disharmony between the psychological sex and the
anatomical sex, the social sex or gender of the individual will be
determined by the anatomical sex. Where, however, with or with-
out medical intervention, the psychological sex and the anatom-
ical sex are harmonized, then the social sex or gender of the in-
dividual should be made to conform to the harmonized status of
the individual and, if such conformity requires changes of a sta-
tistical nature, then such changes should be made. Of course,
such changes should be made only in those cases where physiolog-
ical orientation is complete. 246
Accordingly, Judge Pecora permitted the petitioner in In re Anonymous
to change her name and directed the Board of Health to attach a copy
of the court's order to the petitioner's birth certificate. 247
The compelling logic and humanity of Judge Pecora's decision
would require a change of sex on the certificate itself or, preferably,
the issuance of a new one. Such relief was beyond the power of the
court,248 however, and in any event it would have run counter to
Weiner.249 The inadequacy of the relief granted is apparent since
this petitioner must go through life with a female psyche, anatomy,
and name, but a contrary and embarrassing official document.250 Other
countries and states have seen the need for legal recognition of sex
reassignment either by statute, judicial ruling, or administrative action.
New York should follow suit.
C. Other Changes of Legal Identity
Armed with a new birth certificate, the transsexual can perform
most other documentary changes of identity with relative ease. Even
without such help some changes are possible. Absent fraud one can
change his name at will under the common law. Two New York cases251
indicate that the courts will not invoke the unlikely possibility of fraud
to deny name changes to postoperative transsexuals.252
245 See text accompanying notes 35-49 supra.
246 57 Misc. 2d at 816, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 837.
247 Id. at 817, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 838.
248 Id. at 813-14, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 835.
249 See text accompanying notes 228-33 supra.
250 See Morse & Hall, supra note 234, at 290; Sherwin, supra note 67, at 423-24.
251 In re Anonymous, 64 Misc. 2d 309, 314 N.Y.S.2d 668 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1970); In re
Anonymous, 57 Misc. 2d 813, 293 N.Y.S.2d 834 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1968). See text ac-
companying notes 235-50 supra.
252 Until recently, this was so in California for preoperative as well as postoperative
transsexuals. Each case was decided on its own merits, at the discretion of the judge who
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The Passport Office of the Department of State would, until
recently, issue a new passport on receipt of the original passport, new
photographs, and medical proof that reassignment surgery had been
performed. The proof had to be such that the Passport Office could
conclude that the anatomical structure (i.e., the genitalia) of the trans-
sexual had been changed to that other than what was indicated on the
original passport.253 If the surgery had been performed in a foreign
country, a United States Consulate or Embassy could issue a new pass-
port if the same proof was supplied.254
This liberal policy, however, is no longer followed. The Passport
Office has advised:
The policy adopted by this Office is that a transsexual will
be issued a passport in his legal name and identity, either that
shown by his birth certificate or by court decree. It would make
no difference if the transsexual had been previously issued a pass-
port in another sexual identity.2 55
Stating that it was not "unmindful of the delicately personal and emo-
tional problems involved," the Passport Office nevertheless reasoned
that it could not "administratively make a determination of identity
involving medical factors beyond its competency." 256 Instead, the
Office will rely on the sex and name stated on the applicant's birth
certificate, leaving changes in identity to the agency that issued the
certificate or to the courts. No reasons were offered for this abrupt
reversal in policy.
heard the petition. Letter from Joseph M. Cummins, Secretary of the Superior Court of
California (San Francisco), to Mr. Herbert Donaldson, Chief Counsel, San Francisco
Neighborhood Legal Assistance Foundation, July 6, 1967 (on file at the Cornell Law
Review).
[A]II that was necessary to do was to put the client on the stand and have him or
her testify that he or she was a transsexual living in a sexual role which differed
from that which would ordinarily be identified with the individual's given name
at birth.
Letter from David I. Clayton, Chief Counsel, San Francisco Neighborhood Legal Assistance
Foundation to the Cornell Law Review, Feb. 26, 1971.
One judge who had ruled favorably on several petitions for name changes now declines
to do so, however, because the "granting of prior name changes had resulted in too much
adverse publicity which was directed at him." Id. There has apparently been an informal
decision by the San Francisco Superior Court judges, in caucus, that name change petitions
will be denied until reassignment surgery has actually been performed. Id.
253 Erickson Educational Foundation, supra note 176, at 6.
254 Id. at 5. Confidential Correspondence from the Passport Office to a Transsexual
(copy supplied through the courtesy of the National Transsexual Counseling Unit, San
Francisco, California), Dec. 16, 1970 (on file at the Cornell Law Review).
255 Letter from Robert D. Johnson, Deputy Director of the Passport Office of the
Department of State, to the Cornell Law Review, March 4, 1971.
256 Id.
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Selective Service regulations257 provide for the cancellation of
the records of a registrant only upon the authorization of the Director
of Selective Service. One case of cancellation is known, 258 but the
Selective Service System has not yet ruled on the medical proof re-
quired.259 Since transsexuals would be unfit for military service in
any event because of the surgery and their condition, it is unlikely that
proof greater than a medical affadavit will be required.
Social Security records can be changed with ease. Regulations
exist for a change of name,260 and the Social Security Administration
has a simple form for this purpose. It has been suggested that a brief
explanation of the reasons for the change should be attached to this
form to avoid unnecessary confusion or an investigation when benefits
are later requested.261 A doctor's affidavit might better serve this pur-
pose. This procedure is deceptively simple, however. The total amount
of available benefits varies with different cut-off ages: sixty-two for
women and sixty-five for men.20 2 The agency relies on the information
of record as to a claimant's sex, and no problem arises in the usual
case. For the transsexual who has changed the name appearing on his
records, however, a conflict is apparent and the agency has advised
that "a legal opinion as to its resolution would be required."263
An even greater problem arises if the male-to-female transsexual
subsequently marries and claims any of the various wife's or widow's
benefits available through Social Security. The relevant section of
the Social Security Act264 provides that benefits may be paid only if
the marriage was valid under the laws of the state in which the in-
sured was living at the time the spouse's application is filed, or if the
spouse would be entitled to participate in the distribution of the
insured's intestate property under state law. Since no state law exists
regarding the validity of a transsexual marriage, such an application
would only invite litigation.
Generally, the various administrative agencies have been sym-
257 32 C.F.R. § 1619.2(b) (1971).
258 Confidential Correspondence from the Transsexual Involved to the Author, Dec.
28, 1970.
259 Letter from Col. Maxwell 0. Jensen, Chief, Operations Division, Selective Service
System, to the Cornell Law Review, Jan. 11, 1971.
260 20 C.F.R. § 422.105 (1971). A comparable change of records of the National
Insurance system in England has also been allowed. Green, supra note 33.
261 Erickson Educational Foundation, supra note 176, at 4.
262 42 U.S.C. § 415(b)(3) (1964).
263 Letter from Hugh F. McKenna, Director, Bureau of Retirement and Survivors
Insurance of the Social Security Administration, to the Cornell Law Review, Feb. 9, 1971.
264 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(A) (1964); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1101(a) (1971); Letter from Hugh
F. McKenna, supra note 263.
[Vol. 56:9631002
1971] TRANSSEXUALISM 1003
pathetic to the problems of the transsexual, and assistance has been
given within the scope of existing rules and policies. With such coopera-
tion a postoperative transsexual can successfully start a new life in the
new sex role. The status changes indicated here are but a few of those
required, 2 5 but they suggest that the procedures involved are not
insurmountable.
VI
THE VALIDITY OF POSTOPERATIVE TRANSSEXUAL MARRIAGES
The right to marry is one of the fundamental civil rights of man.206
The desire of a postoperative2 6 7 transsexual to exercise that right is
perfectly natural, and many have in fact married in the new sex.268
Since marriage is, by definition, a relationship betveen people of
265 Another example is that of the driver's license, where problems arise primarily
before surgery. California allows a new license to be issued to a preoperative transsexual
when the application includes a letter from a physician describing the individual as a
"female for all intents and purposes, despite being organically a male." Erickson Educa-
tional Foundation, supra note 176, at 5. Pennsylvania has recently issued a new license with
only initials being used, avoiding the question of sex completely. Erickson Educational
Foundation Newsletter, supra note 51, at 1. The importance of a new driver's license is
apparent when one considers the length of time surgical teams require transsexuals to live
in the new sex role before surgery is performed. Text accompanying notes 58-60 supra.
A Georgia transsexual allegedly encountered job discrimination after reassignment
surgery. Confidential Correspondence from the Transsexual Involved to the Author, Jan.
25, 1971. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission offered its assistance if the
problem should arise again. Such help could well lead to litigation over the transsexual's
legal sex. A suit is pending in California in which a transsexual claims sex discrimination.
Erickson Educational Foundation, supra note 176, at 8.
200 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1966); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 816 U.S. 535, 541
(1941). The institution of marriage is protected by the fourteenth amendment to the
Constitution (Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1922)), and possibly by the ninth
amendment (Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496 (Goldberg, J., concurring)). See also
Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
The right to marry is one of the fundamental rights listed in both Article 16 of the
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (YEARJooK OF THE UNrrED NATIONS
1948-49, at 536 (1950)), and Article 12 of the European Convention on Human Rights
(EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, COLLECEO TEXTS 6 (5th ed. 1966)).
207 This discussion is limited to postoperative marriages. Before surgery the trans-
sexual is clearly of one sex by anatomical criteria, and a marriage with another person of
the same anatomical sex would generally be considered a homosexual relationship. Al-
though the preoperative transsexual, because of his cross-gender identification, would
consider the relationship heterosexual, society most likely would not.
268 If the transsexual has been able to secure a new birth certificate, a marriage license
may be easily procured. If not, the marriage most likely will take place in a state that does
not require such a certificate. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.051 (1964). See also Bowman
: Engle 308; Money & Schwartz, supra note 52, at 261.
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opposite sexes, 269 the law will be required to pass on the transsexual's
legal sex in order to ascertain the validity of these marriages.27 0
This question has been litigated in England in a recent case,
Corbett v. Corbett (otherwise Ashley).2 71 The transsexual involved,
George Jamieson, had been registered at birth as a male and reared
as such.2 7 2 At the age of twenty-five, he underwent sex reassignment
surgery that included the creation of an artificial vagina. The name
April Ashley was adopted after the operation. Arthur Corbett, April's
husband, was a transvestite273 who had experienced sexual relations
209 An example of the inadequacy of such a definition, if sex is determined only with
reference to anatomical factors, is given by Stutte. He describes a case known to him of a
marriage between a male and a person with an XO chromosome pattern, no gonads, and
a female psyche. Gender identity aside, such a person is biologically neuter and is either
capable of marrying either a man or a woman, or is incapable of marrying at all. Stutte,
supra note 18, at 241-42.
270 The validity of a transsexual marriage also hinges on other factors, as do all
marriages; for example, fraud and absence of consummation. Without full disclosure of
the transsexual's history and surgery to the prospective spouse, the marriage would
probably be voidable for fraud. See. e.g., Potter v. Potter, 27 App. Div. 2d 634, 275 N.Y.S.2d
499 (4th Dep't 1966) (marriage annulled because husband had failed to disclose his
affliction with voyeurism (Peeping Tom syndrome)); N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 140(e) (McKin-
ney 1964).
The transsexual must also be physically capable of consummating the marriage. See,
e.g., N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 140(d) (McKinney 1964). Since the artificial penis constructed
for a female transsexual is usually not sexually functional (see Hoopes, supra note 37, at
541-43), this would preclude the possibility of a female transsexual's marriage as a man.
Ordinary legal rules regarding consummation, however, should not apply here. Marriages
between elderly persons are not condemned by the laws of any state or by society, even
though the couple may not contemplate sexual intercourse or even be capable of it. The
same rationale that allows to older persons companionship and love in a marital setting
should allow them to the transsexual. Since it is assumed that the spouse has been fully
informed of the surgery and its obvious limitation regarding sexual activity, the marriage
should not be held voidable for inability to consummate, especially if it appears that this
is being used by a spouse to nullify a marriage unsatisfactory for other reasons. Divorce
procedures should be used in such cases. Problems such as these should not arise for
male-to-female transsexuals, as an artificial vagina, if constructed, renders the transsexual
capable of intercourse. But see note 191 supra.
271 [1970] 2 W.L.R. 1806, 2 All E.R. 33 (P.D.A.).
272 The story of George's life is typical of many transsexuals. At the age of 16 he
joined the Merchant Navy, in which he remained until he attempted suicide a year
later. The psychiatrist to whom he was referred reported in 1953 that "[tlhis boy is a
constitutional homosexual who says he wants to become a woman." Id. at 1310, 2 All E.R.
at 86. In 1956 George joined a troupe of female impersonators performing at a night club
in Paris; by that time he had already commenced the regular taking of the female hormone
estrogen. His reassignment surgery was performed in 1960 in Casablanca.
273 Arthur arranged to meet April through a transvestite friend with the motive of
learning more about how she made herself so convincingly feminine. However, he testified
that he soon became attracted to her as a man to a woman, although there was also
evidence that he often was jealous of her success in the female role-a role he had not
been able to attain with any success in his periods of transvestism. Id. at 1311-12, 2 All
E.R. at 37-28.
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short of anal intercourse with numerous men.274
Both parties sought an annulment on the ground of incapacity
or willful refusal to consummate the marriage. Arthur alleged the
additional ground that the marriage was between two males and there-
fore void. It was this latter issue that was of primary interest to the
court.275 Expert medical testimony was presented by both sides regarding
the various factors of sex determination and the relevance of these
factors to the case. Judge Ormrod found that:
The respondent has been shown to have XY chromosomes and
therefore to be of male chromosomal sex; to have had testicles
prior to the operation and therefore to be of male gonadal sex;
to have had male external genitalia without any evidence of in-
ternal or external female sex organs and, therefore, to be of male
genital sex; and psychologically to be a transsexual .... Socially,
by which I mean the manner in which the respondent is living in
the community, she is living as, and passing as a woman, more or
less successfully. Her outward appearance at first sight was con-
vincingly feminine but on closer and longer examination in the
witness box it was much less so. The voice, manner, gestures and
attitudes became increasingly reminiscent of the accomplished
female impersonator. The evidence of the medical inspectors...
is that the body in its post-operative condition looks more like a
female than a male as a result of very skilful surgery. Professor
Dewhurst, after this examination, put his opinion in these words;
"the pastiche of feminity [sic] was convincing." That, in my judg-
ment, is an accurate description of the respondent.276
Judge Ormrod, who is also a medical doctor,277 reasoned that
since marriage is "essentially a relationship between man and woman,
the validity of the marriage in this case .depends, in my judgment, upon
whether the respondent is or is not a woman. '273 More specifically he
chose to determine what is meant by the word "woman" in the con-
text of a marriage.279 His conclusion in this regard was disturbingly
simplistic.
274 Id. at 1311, 2 All E.R. at 37.
275 Judge Ormrod did state that he was prepared to hold in the alternative that April
had been physically incapable of consummating the marriage. See note 191 supra.
276 [1970] 2 W.L.R. at 1322-23, 2 All E.R. at 46-47.
277 Letter from James Comyn, Q.C., Attorney for April Ashley, to the Cornell Law
Review, Jan. 5, 1971.
278 [1970] 2 W.L.R. at 1324, 2 All E.R. at 48.
279 The judge specifically allowed the possibility of April Ashley's sex being classified
differently for different purposes. He stated that this would be illogical only "if marriage
were substantially similar in character to national insurance and other social situations,
but the differences are obviously fundamental. These submissions, in effect, confuse sex
with gender." Id. at 1325, 2 All E.R. at 49. Cf. note 36 supra.
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Having regard to the essentially heterosexual character of the
relationship which is called marriage, the criteria must, in my
judgment, be biological, for even the most extreme degree of trans-
sexualism in a male or the most severe hormonal imbalance which
can exist in a person with male chromosomes, male gonads and
male genitalia, cannot reproduce a person who is naturally capa-
ble of performing the essential role of a woman in marriage. In
other words, the law should adopt in the first place, the first three
of the doctors' criteria, i.e., the chromosomal, gonadal and genital
tests, and if all three are congruent; determine the sex for the
purpose of marriage accordingly, and ignore any operative inter-
vention.2S0
Conspicuously absent from the opinion is a description of the
"essential role of a woman in marriage." Without such a description
one can only speculate why only a person with certain biological
attributes can fulfill it or why a person without those attributes can-
not. If by this phrase Judge Ormrod meant the ability to procreate,
he would void innumerable marriages throughout the world. If he
meant the ability to have sexual intercourse as a woman he ignored
the uncontroverted evidence of his own court medical examiners,
who reported "there is no impediment on 'her part' to sexual inter-
course."28 In addition, April Ashley had testified to successful sexual
relations with at least one man prior to the marriage.2 2 If he meant
the ability to look and act like a woman he rebutted his own admission
that April's "outward appearance . . . was convincingly feminine."
Calling her an "accomplished female impersonator" does not detract
from her conceded ability to appear feminine.
The only clue Judge Ormrod gave to his meaning is his state-
ment:
It is common ground between all the medical witnesses that the
biological sexual constitution of an individual is fixed at birth (at
the latest), and cannot be changed, either by the natural develop-
ment of organs of the opposite sex, or by medical or surgical
means. The respondent's operation, therefore, cannot affect her
true sex.2 s3
"True" sex is biologically determined at or before birth-perhaps at
the instant of conception. A person who is "naturally capable of per-
forming the essential role of a woman in marriage" is one who has
280 [1970] 2 W.L.R. at 1324-25, 2 All E.R. at 48 (emphasis added).
281 Id. at 1315, 2 All E.R. at 41.
282 Id. at 1311, 2 All E.R. at 37.
288 Id. at 1323, 2 All E.R. at 47 (emphasis added). Dr. Benjamin has suggested that sex
in the chromosomal sense is fixed at conception. BENJAMm 46-47.
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certain biological traits-coincidentally those that are determined at
or before birth. Accordingly, whether a person can be a woman for
the purposes of marriage is determined at or before birth. The "essen-
tial role of a woman in marriage" under this view is simply being a
woman from conception or birth.
Such a fatalistic approach ignores the subtle but nevertheless real
effects of human social and physical development. It excludes the es-
sence of human existence: the ability to affect one's own destiny. It
reduces life to a collection of mere physical events. Nevertheless, such
an approach inexorably comes from the apparent meaning of the
judge's words. Such few words perhaps do not deserve such severe
criticism, but the fact that the Corbett case stands as the sole precedent
for courts throughout the world to follow in a novel and controversial
area requires that it withstand the strictest scrutiny.
Corbett will of course be distinguishable from future cases
that may arise. This case involved not just a transsexual marriage but
a relationship with a rather odd man of varied sexual inclinations:
heterosexual,2 4 homosexual,28 5 and transvestite.2 6 A relationship with
a more stable partner would have the aura of legitimacy lacking in
Corbett. No complete sexual relations actually took place between the
parties on any view of the evidence.2 7 This was not a long term or
ongoing relationship that was declared void; the parties had lived to-
gether only fourteen days. In addition, exhaustive preoperative evalua-
tion and diagnosis was lacking in Corbett. The court had a freer
hand in deciding the wisdom of recognizing the surgery, since the
medical profession had not played as full a role as it would in trans-
sexual operations in the United States. 28 8
Eventually this issue will be faced by a court in this country or
elsewhere. The standard that Judge Ormrod suggested, absent the
element of biological determinism, is sound. The marriage should be
valid if the transsexual is found capable of fulfilling the essential
marriage role of the sex he or she has assumed. Such a role should be
284 1970] 2 W.L.R. at 1311, 2 All E.R. at 37.
285 Id.
286 Id. See also id. at 1313, 2 All E.R. at 38.
287 During their three-year courtship no sexual intimacies took place other than
kissing and what the judge characterized as "very mild petting." Id. at 1312, 2 All E.R. at
38. After the wedding ceremony, Arthur made sexual advances, which were rejected be-
cause April complained of abscesses in her vagina. Evidence regarding later sexual activity
was in direct conflict. Arthur maintained that his wife continued to complain of the
abscesses while April contended Arthur had achieved full penetration on several occasions
but had withdrawn without ejaculation, bursting into tears. Id. at 1314, 2 All E.R. at 39.
288 See notes 51-61 and accompanying text supra.
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considered a composite of factors ranging from those incapable of
definition, such as the ability to love and understand another, to those
more concrete, such as the ability to engage in sexual intercourse. The
validity of a transsexual marriage cannot be determined by specific
rules without sacrificing the human compassion so essential to justice.
A marriage, transsexual or otherwise, should not be declared to have
legally never existed unless it is apparent that the marriage never
existed in the minds of the parties themselves.2 9
If it is held that a transsexual marriage is not void as a matter
of law, there is the further problem of the transsexual who is already
married when the operation is performed. This problem is alleviated
somewhat because many doctors consider prior marriage in the original
sex role to be an indication that the individual is not a true trans-
sexual.29 0 Some surgical teams refuse to operate on a married indi-
vidual.291 Nevertheless, some married transsexuals have undergone
surgery abroad and have continued to live with their original wives
as "sisters." 292 Consistency would require a holding that such a mar-
riage has become void as between two women. It does not seem wise,
however, to declare a marriage void that was valid at its inception
and may have produced children. Divorce would seem a better pro-
cedure, although it may be difficult to establish one of the traditional
grounds. For example, an English court in Dolling v. Dolling293 held
that a husband's change of sex did not amount to cruelty in law. If
annulment is inappropriate in such a case, a liberal construction of the
grounds for divorce is required.2 94
CONCLUSION
The medical and legal issues presented by the sex reassignment
operation are many and difficult. Future judicial response hopefully
289 Such a theory is consistent with existing law, as illustrated by the following. A
requirement of absence from fraud or duress ensures that both parties fully intended to
become married. The consummation requirement suggests that the law needs proof that
both parties could and did give of themselves emotionally and physically to establish their
relationship. One cannot marry while still married to another because it is felt that the
relationship of a married couple is such that it requires the severance of any bonds that
might interfere.
290 Hastings, supra note 53, at 249; J. Randell, supra note 37.
291 Hastings, supra note 53, at 249.
292 Toronto Daily Star, July 13, 1968, at 13, col. 1.
293 Unreported, 1958, discussed in Bartholomew 83.
294 The parties, of course, can "arrange" their divorce on the grounds of desertion
(see N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1970, at 62, cols. 4-8) or in other such uncontested actions.
[Vol. 56:9631008
1971] TRANSSEXUALISM 1009
will be liberal and understanding. The guidepost of legal decision-
making in this area should always be what is in the best interests of
the transsexual, for those interests and the interests of society are
not in conflict.
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